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Investigation of function allocation for the Next Generation A ir T ransportation System is being 
conducted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (N ASA).  To provide insight on 
comparability of different function allocations for separation assurance, two human-in-the-loop simulation 
experiments were conducted on homogeneous airborne and ground-based approaches to four-dimensional 
trajectory-based operations, one refer red to as ‘ground-based  automated  separation  assurance’  (ground-
based) and the other as ‘airborne trajectory management with self-separation’ (airborne).  In the 
coordinated simulations at NASA’s Ames and Langley Research Centers, controllers for the ground-based 
concept at Ames and pilots for the airborne concept at Langley managed the same traffic scenarios using 
the two different concepts.  The common scenarios represented a significant increase in ai rspace demand 
over cur rent operations.  Using common independent variables, the simulations varied traffic density, 
scheduling constraints, and the timing of trajectory change events. Common metr ics were collected to 
enable a comparison of relevant results. Where comparisons were possible, no substantial differences in 
performance or operator acceptability were observed. Mean schedule conformance and flight path 
deviation were considered adequate for both approaches. Conflict detection warning times and resolution 
times were mostly adequate, but certain conflict situations were detected too late to be resolved in a timely 
manner . This led to some situations in which safety was compromised and/or workload was rated as being 
unacceptable in both experiments. Operators acknowledged these issues in thei r responses and ratings but 
gave generally positive assessments of the respective concept and operations they experienced. F uture 
studies will evaluate technical improvements and procedural enhancements to achieve the required level of 
safety and acceptability and will investigate the integration of airborne and ground-based capabilities 
within the same ai rspace to leverage the benefits of each concept. 
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Nomenclature 
4D  =  Four Dimensional 
ADS-B  =  Automatic Dependent Surveillance 
Broadcast 
AFR  =  Autonomous Flight Rules 
ANOVA  =  Analysis of Variance 
ANSP  =  Air Navigation Service Provider 
AOL  =  Airspace Operations Laboratory 
AOP  =  Autonomous Operations Planner 
ASAS  =  Airborne Separation Assistance 
System 
ASTOR  =  Aircraft Simulation for Traffic 
Operations Research 
ATC  =  Air Traffic Control 
ATM  =  Air Traffic Management 
ATOL  =  Air Traffic Operations Laboratory 
ATOS  =  Airspace and Traffic Operations 
Simulation 
CARS  =  Controller Acceptance Rating Scale 
ETA  =  Estimated Time of Arrival  
FAA  =  Federal Aviation Administration 
FL  =  Flight Level 
FMS  =  Flight Management System 
ft  =  Feet 
HITL  =  Human in the Loop 
JPDO  =  Joint Planning and Development 
Office 
LOS  =  Loss of Separation 
M  =  Moderate duration scenario 
MACS  =  Multi Aircraft Control System 
MAP  =  Monitor Alert Parameter 
MCH  =  Modified Cooper Harper 
MCP  =  Mode Control Panel 
NASA  =  National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
NextGen  =  Next Generation Air Transportation 
System 
nmi  =  Nautical miles 
RTA  =  Required Time of Arrival 
S  =  Short duration scenario 
STA  =  Scheduled Time of Arrival 
TCP  =  Trajectory Change Point 
TMX  =  Traffic Manager  
TLX  =  Task Load Index 
TSAF E  =  Tactical Separation Assisted Flight 
Environment 
ZID =  Indianapolis Center 
ZKC =  Kansas City Center 
I . Introduction 
HE Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) has identified the action area ‘Air/Ground  Function 
Allocation’ as a high priority research need for the development of the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System (NextGen).1 Function allocation is a system design question that seeks to determine how certain processes, 
roles, or responsibilities related to key functions of Air Traffic Management (ATM) might be redistributed among 
actors to sustain system performance at an adequate level, and perhaps enhance it substantially, as air traffic demand 
grows beyond the limits of the current ATM system.  The air traffic growth expected to occur over the next two 
decades is significant.  For the period 2010 to 2030, forecasters are projecting system capacity, measured in 
‘available seat miles’ – the overall yardstick for how busy aviation is both domestically and internationally – to 
grow an average of 3.4 percent a year, or to nearly double in that 20-year time period.2  Load factors are already 
high today, and thus most of this growth will be absorbed by additional aircraft operations, which equates to 
additional workload for air traffic controllers in  today’s  operational  environment.  The substantial delays 
experienced in the summer of 2000 indicated an ATM system already nearing its capacity limits.  As indicated by 
the trends of NextGen, a consensus has formed that the current methods of Air Traffic Control (ATC) and 
management, if left unmodified, cannot indefinitely sustain the projected traffic growth without inducing significant 
delays and inefficiencies. 
Separating aircraft is the most important task for an air traffic controller in high density airspace, and it is one of 
the main factors in controller workload today.  To keep the workload manageable in current operations, a Monitor 
Alert Parameter (MAP) for each sector of airspace is used as an operating capacity limit. A  sector’s MAP value 
reflects the maximum instantaneous aircraft count that can be safely handled by a sector controller.  It is recognized 
that actual sector capacity is not defined by aircraft count alone, but also includes many additional factors that define 
the air traffic complexity in that airspace.  Recent research was conducted to investigate this relationship between air 
traffic complexity and sector capacity.3  In a Human-In-The-Loop (HITL) simulation, a complexity threshold for a 
simulated sector was determined by participant controllers in terms of their self-assessed workload as aircraft count 
was steadily increased. The complexity threshold was determined to be reached when the participant controller 
called for the aircraft insertion to be stopped.  The experiment results showed that aircraft count can safely exceed 
the MAP value by several aircraft in low complexity scenarios but not when complexity was considered high.  This 
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result indicates that, while some gains in capacity may yet be possible by better understanding and controlling the 
factors that govern traffic complexity, the approach of separating aircraft using current day techniques remains 
inherently limited by controller workload and will not be able to support the expected traffic growth. 
Hence, separation assurance has become a significant field of research and development.  Studying alternative 
methodologies to separation assurance equates to exploring a reallocation of separation-related functions between 
the principal actors, ground-based and airborne, as well as between humans and automation.  To enable sustained 
growth, the JPDO is interested in such research that considers alternative allocations of the functions involved in 
separating aircraft in high density airspace.  The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is the lead 
agency tasked with pursuing the necessary research activities. Teams at two NASA research centers, Ames and 
Langley, have been studying advanced concepts for ‘separation assurance’ for many years and have developed two 
concepts to a fairly high level of simulation fidelity in their respective laboratories.  The two concepts feature 
distinctly different allocations of separation-related functions between air and ground, as well as between human and 
automation.  The two concepts will be described in further detail in the next section of the report.  However, the 
following summaries illustrate the high-level similarities and differences between the concepts.   Both concepts 
involve new automation capabilities and new procedures for the human participants, either controllers or pilots.  The 
primary difference between the concepts lies in the location of these changes, in ground-based ATC facilities in one 
concept and distributed among aircraft in the other.  An additional difference lies in the degree of automation 
autonomy; separation assurance is fully automated in the first concept with human handling of exceptions identified 
by the automation, and interactive in the second concept with human involvement in each trajectory change for 
separation. 
In the concept ground-based automated separation assurance4 (‘ground-based concept’), ground-based 
automation and air traffic controllers manage the separation between all aircraft within a defined airspace. The 
automation system predicts aircraft trajectories, detects conflicts, computes resolution trajectories, and issues 
trajectory amendments automatically to aircraft by data link communication if the resolution is within acceptable 
limits.  The air traffic controller monitors the operation and is available for providing services and handling 
exceptions, such as creating or approving trajectories when the initial automated solution is outside the predefined 
tolerances.  For example, the automation may determine that a traffic conflict requires a 4000 feet (ft) altitude 
change, but has been configured to issue only altitude changes automatically if they are within 2200 ft. In this case, 
the controller can still approve the solution, or use the ground-based trajectory automation to look for a different 
trajectory change or move a different aircraft.  The role of the pilot, unchanged from current day operations, is to 
execute the instructions in a timely manner.  Automation systems onboard the aircraft are a Flight Management 
System (FMS) and an auto-flight system capable of flying trajectories that meet route, altitude and speed constraints 
received via data link from the ground-based automation. 
In the concept airborne trajectory management with self-separation5 (‘airborne concept’), the pilot manages the 
separation for his or her aircraft supported by onboard Airborne Separation Assistance System (ASAS) automation.  
The function allocation between human and automation in the airborne concept differs slightly from the ground-
based concept in that the pilot is involved in each conflict resolution, whereas conflicts in the ground-based concept 
are often resolved automatically without controller involvement.  Using airborne surveillance information, the 
ASAS automation predicts aircraft trajectories, detects conflicts, alerts the pilot appropriately, computes resolution 
trajectory alternatives, and displays these alternatives to the pilot.  The pilot selects from among the alternative 
resolutions and executes the new trajectory usually through the FMS and auto-flight system.  On the ground side, the 
controller performs no separation function for the ASAS-equipped aircraft.  The Air Navigation Service Provider 
(ANSP) supplies ASAS-equipped aircraft with any trajectory constraints that may exist for traffic flow management 
purposes.  The most common constraint would be a Required Time of Arrival (RTA) at an airspace boundary where 
ground-based control of the aircraft will resume. 
Research of these concepts over the years has involved a number of separate HITL simulations of each concept.  
The simulation facilities used in these studies focused their highest modeling fidelity on the aspects most 
significantly changed for each concept, i.e., on the ground-based systems for the ground-based concept and the 
airborne systems for the airborne concept.  Targeting fidelity in this way enabled detailed evaluations of automation 
tools and procedures by certified professional controllers and active commercial transport pilots using interfaces 
similar to their operational equipment.  Consequently, the concepts have reached their respective levels of maturity 
in simulation facilities having a different emphases, which becomes important when comparing the performance of 
the concepts with each other.   
Such a comparison of concepts is desired by the JPDO to address the “lack of clarity in the allocation of new 
functions to the aircraft and flight crew (includes human/automation as well as avionics/ground automation 
allocations).”1  NASA’s ATM  research  emphasizes a range of airborne and ground-based capabilities.  The user 
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community of NextGen will be as diverse as it is today, if not more so.  The variations in operational models and 
business cases will dictate that systems appropriate for one user may not be suitable for another.  This diversity calls 
for a range of available operational modes, within which each user can select the operation that best meets their 
needs.  NASA’s  research seeks not  to compete one concept against  the other  for an eventual victor, but rather to 
illuminate the characteristics of each concept through simulation and experimentation and to mature their designs to 
eventually enable multiple viable modes of operation for NextGen including mixed operations. 
To support this need, NASA is pursuing a series of simulations to compare and integrate airborne and ground-
based concepts.  Two initial HITL experiments have been jointly designed and conducted to make comparisons 
where possible and identify where they cannot.  Referred  to  in  this paper as  “airborne experiment” and “ground-
based experiment”, these experiments simulated nominal, homogeneous operations and are the first in the series of 
planned coordinated experiments that will continue to promote comparability where possible while addressing issues 
of mixed operations and off-nominal events.  Results are intended to provide guidance to future function allocation 
research and development efforts. The HITL simulations were designed to determine whether human operators can 
effectively operate within the Four Dimensional (4D) concept under investigation to enable aircraft to safely traverse 
high density airspace. The human operators that served as subject participants in these initial experiments were 
controllers for the ground-based concept and pilots for the airborne concept.  Data were collected to assess the 
acceptability of the concepts to the human operators and to evaluate the effectiveness of the associated technologies 
and procedures in high density airspace.   
This paper provides an overview of the joint experiment design, a discussion of comparability, and comparable 
and non-comparable data.  Section II presents the two operational concepts in greater detail.  Section III describes 
the simulation facilities and automation tools.  Section IV describes the common and differing aspects of experiment 
design.  Section V presents detailed results and discussion.  Section VI presents a summary of findings, and Section 
VII presents conclusions and recommendations for future function allocation research. 
I I . Operational Concepts 
The two operational concepts are described as they were presented to the experiment subjects (i.e., participant 
pilots or controllers).  A discussion follows in which conceptual issues related to comparability of experimental 
results are considered.  It should be noted that the concept descriptions herein are generally limited to the aspects 
represented in these experiments and do not comprehensively address all aspects of an operational concept.  As 
these experiments were designed to simulate homogeneous operations in nominal conditions, many details involving 
mixed operations and off-nominal conditions were not included in the experiment or the concept descriptions below. 
A . G round-based Concept  
Ground-based automated separation assurance is a concept that involves a centralized system with ground-side 
automation components that monitor and/or manage nominal trajectory-based operations of equipped aircraft, while 
the controller handles off-nominal operations, provides additional services, and makes decisions on situations that 
are presented to him/her.4 The separation responsibility resides with the ANSP, here meaning both the air traffic 
controller and the ground-based  automation.  The  primary  difference  to  today’s  system  is  that  the  ground-based 
automation is responsible for conflict detection, and separation assurance automation generates conflict resolution 
trajectories integrated with data link. The modified trajectories are sent to aircraft either by the controller or directly 
by the ground-based automation,  whenever  certain  predefined  criteria  are met.  The  flight  crews’  responsibilities 
related to separation assurance do not change from the current day. 
 
1. Enabling Environment 
The concept of automated separation assurance is enabled by integrating controller workstations, ground-based 
automation, data link, flight management automation, and flight deck interfaces. The ground automation creates, 
maintains, and communicates trajectories for each flight. The air traffic environment is generally based upon the 
mid-term environment for the high altitude airspace outlined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)6 and 
assumes the following characteristics: Each aircraft entering high altitude airspace is equipped with an FMS that 
meet a required navigation performance value of 1.0 and have integrated data link for route modifications, frequency 
changes, cruise altitudes, climb, cruise, and descent speeds, similar to those available in current day Future Air 
Navigation System technology. Data link is the primary means of communication, and all aircraft are cleared to 
proceed, climb, cruise and descend via their nominal or uplinked trajectories. High accuracy surveillance 
information for position and speed is provided via Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) or a 
comparable source. In order to reduce trajectory uncertainties, FMS values for climb, cruise/ descent speeds, and 
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weight are communicated to the ATC system. The goal is to make conflict detection highly reliable and to detect 
trajectory-based conflicts with enough time before initial Loss Of Separation (LOS). However, some sources of 
trajectory uncertainties remain and include flight technical differences, trajectory mismatches between the air and 
the ground, inaccurate performance estimates and inaccurate weather forecasts used by the air and the ground 
automation. A conformance monitoring function detects off-trajectory operations and triggers an off-trajectory 
conflict probe. The trajectory generation function used for conflict resolution and all trajectory planning provides 
FMS compatible and loadable trajectories. These trajectories account for the nominal transmission and execution 
delays associated with data link messaging. Automated trajectory-based conflict resolutions are generated for 
conflicts with more than three minutes to initial loss of separation. When conflicts are detected within a short time 
before LOS, an automated tactical conflict avoidance function can generate heading changes and send this 
information to the flight deck via a separate high-priority data link path. 
 
2. Roles and Responsibilities 
The ANSP is responsible for maintaining safe separation between aircraft. The ground automation is responsible 
for  detecting  “strategic”  medium-term conflicts (typically up to 15 minutes) between all trajectories and for 
monitoring the compliance status of all aircraft relative to their reference trajectory. The ground automation is also 
responsible for detecting “tactical” short-term conflicts (typically 0 to 3 minutes) between all aircraft. Whenever the 
ground automation cannot resolve a conflict without controller involvement, it must alert the controller early enough 
so that he or she can make an informed decision and keep the aircraft safely separated. The ground automation is 
responsible for alerting controllers to problems and exceptional situations.  
The controller is supervising the automation and is responsible for making decisions on all situations that are 
presented to him or her by the automation, flight crews or other ANSP operators, such as controllers or traffic 
managers.  Additionally, they are responsible for providing service in time-based metering and weather avoidance 
operations.  Issuing control instructions to non data-link-equipped aircraft is also the responsibility of the controller. 
The controller can use conflict detection and resolution automation to generate new trajectories for any aircraft. 
Controllers use data link to communicate with equipped aircraft and voice for non data link-equipped aircraft.  
Flight crews are responsible for following their uplinked (or initially preferred) trajectory within defined 
tolerances and for the safe conduct of their 
flight (just like today). Flight crews can 
downlink trajectory change requests at any 
time. The ground automation probes the 
request for conflicts without involving the 
controller. If the requested trajectory is 
conflict free, the automation uplinks an 
approval message, otherwise it alerts the 
controller that there is a trajectory request 
to be reviewed.  
 
3. Air Traffic Controller Workstation 
Figure 1 depicts the air traffic controller 
workstation prototype designed for the 
above distribution of roles and 
responsibilities. Aircraft that are managed 
by the automation within the controller’s 
sector are displayed brighter than the 
aircraft outside that area, which are low-
lighted. Additional information in data tags 
and colors are used to draw the controller’s 
attention to a specific problem. The display 
is designed for general situation awareness 
and management by exception. The sector 
displayed in the figure contains 
approximately three times as many aircraft 
as can be controlled within this sector in 
current day operations. 
 
 
F igure 1. Controller display with conflict list , weather 
depiction, timeline and a provisional tra jectory . 
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All functions for conflict detection and resolution, trajectory planning and routine operations are directly 
accessible from the controller display. Transfer of control and communication between sectors is conducted by the 
automation close to the sector boundaries. Nominally, aircraft are displayed as chevrons with altitudes, a design 
originally developed for cockpit displays of traffic information7. Traffic conflict information, hazard penetration and 
metering information is presented where applicable. Full data tags are only displayed in short-term conflict 
situations, or when the controller selects them manually. Time-based metering is supported via timelines and meter 
lists. The timelines show aircrafts’ estimated and scheduled arrival times at specific fixes, which are often meter 
fixes into congested airports. 
The controller can request trajectories to avoid traffic conflicts and weather hazards and to solve metering 
conflicts via various easy-to use mechanisms, using keyboard entries, data tag items, the conflict list, or the timeline. 
The automated trajectory-based conflict resolutions are generated by an autoresolver module originally developed as 
part of the Advanced Airspace Concept.8 When initiated by the controller, the automatically generated trajectory 
becomes a provisional trial-plan trajectory (indicated in cyan in Fig. 1). The controller can then modify and/or 
uplink the trajectory constraints to the aircraft. All trajectory changes are immediately probed for conflicts and 
provide real-time feedback on their status, before they are sent. Therefore, the tools are designed to be interactively 
used.  
B . Airborne Concept  
Airborne trajectory management with self-separation is a concept in which the pilots of equipped aircraft 
actively manage their trajectories while maintaining separation from traffic.  The pilot is responsible for separation 
but relies on flight deck automation for critical support functions such as monitoring the traffic, detecting conflicts, 
computing resolution alternatives, and probing for potential new conflicts in pilot-proposed maneuvers.  The 
controller does not have any role in separating AFR aircraft.  However, the concept assumes that trajectories are 
subject to ground-based flow management constraints that enable orderly transitions to and from ground-managed 
terminal airspace.  Because no single person or automation system manages separation for all aircraft within an 
entire airspace region, the concept is a distributed approach to separation.  Each aircraft manages its own separation, 
and automated methods of implicit coordination are implemented to ensure the actions of multiple aircraft are 
complementary.   Thus,  the primary differences  from  today’s operation are  the highly distributed allocation of  the 
separation  function  to  equipped  aircraft  and  the  human’s  reliance  on  automation  for  performing  key  support 
functions.   
Although the concept of self-separation is vehicle-centric in many ways, inter-aircraft coordination and system 
optimization also play central roles.  Coordination is applied implicitly through, for example, right-of-way rules 
built into the pilot’s automation tool.  Right-of-way is typically based on conflict geometry (similar to Visual Flight 
Rules) but may also be designed to incorporate a variety of additional system-level optimization objectives, such as 
giving arrival traffic priority over crossing traffic.  Since the right-of-way rules are encoded directly in the 
automation and do not rely on human memory or interpretation, the rule set may be as complex and extensive as 
needed to provide the desired system-level balance of equity and efficiency.  
AFR operations may occur in homogeneous airspace (all aircraft as AFR) or in mixed-operations airspace (AFR 
and ground-managed aircraft sharing the airspace without segregation).  Mixed operations are enabled by rules and 
coordination mechanisms between the AFR aircraft and the ANSP, and these issues will be the focus of the next 
function allocation joint simulations.   
   
1. Enabling Environment 
An aircraft performing airborne trajectory management with self-separation is said to be operating under 
‘Autonomous Flight Rules’ (AFR).  The AFR concept is enabled first and foremost by airborne surveillance.  The 
recent mandate by the FAA that all aircraft operating in transponder airspace be equipped with ADS-B Out by 2020 
produces a surveillance-rich environment for aircraft equipped with ADS-B In, and the AFR concept envisions 
making full operational use of this information.   Each AFR aircraft will receive rapidly updated state data 
broadcasted by all aircraft within reception range, i.e. the same position, altitude, groundspeed and vertical speed 
information used by the broadcasting aircraft for guidance, navigation, and control.  In addition to this state vector 
information, the airborne concept also makes use of 4D trajectory information sent as a sequence of Trajectory 
Change Points (TCP).  The AFR tool uses TCPs to reconstruct the near-term (~25 minutes) trajectories of 
broadcasting aircraft for use in conflict detection and resolution support.  TCP broadcast is not currently in the ADS-
B Out mandate, but it is included in ADS-B standards as a future capability and is expected to result in better system 
performance.  
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AFR operations would occur primarily in the en-route phase of flight but could also include segments of the 
departure and arrival phases.  With the arrival phase comes the requirement for AFR aircraft to sequence into 
terminal airspace, and in high density environments, AFR aircraft would transition to ground-based control in the 
vicinity of a metering fix.  A typical trajectory constraint for AFR aircraft would be an RTA at the metering fix, 
delivered from the ANSP to the aircraft through data link prior to the top-of-descent.    
 
2. Roles and Responsibilities 
The pilot’s responsibility is defined by four AFR procedural requirements or “rules.”  These rules were presented 
to the pilot participants in this experiment in the following priority order.   
AFR Rule #1: The pilot must resolve traffic conflicts without delay when notified by the AFR tool.  The pilot 
may select from a set of tool-provided resolutions and must execute the selected resolution in a timely fashion.  
Figure 2 shows the aircraft navigation display with an example of a conflict (white segment and aircraft) and a 
resolution (blue line).  Resolutions from the AFR tool are nominally in the form of a strategic, closed-path route that 
is uploadable to the FMS, but may also be tactical, open-form instructions, akin to controller vectoring, to be 
executed using Mode Control Panel (MCP) guidance. 
AFR Rule #2: The pilot must use the AFR tool to check any trajectory changes for conflicts before executing the 
change (for turbulence, weather hazards, fuel efficiency, etc.).  Specifically, this rule prohibits a trajectory change 
that would create a so-called  ‘Level 2’ conflict  alert  for any aircraft,  including  their own.   This notification  level 
indicates greater urgency to resolve because of reduced time until LOS.   Less urgent  ‘Level  1’  conflicts may be 
temporarily created but must then be resolved according to AFR Rule #1.   
AFR Rule #3: The pilot ensures that the aircraft’s trajectory will conform to ATC constraints, should any be in 
effect.  ATC constraints may include special use airspace restrictions or RTAs for arrival metering.  Any changes to 
the trajectory must ultimately support RTA conformance, otherwise ATC must be notified if the constraint becomes 
unachievable.  If a path stretch is necessary to absorb a delay, the pilot must use the AFR tool to devise a conflict-
free path, in accordance with AFR Rule #2. 
AFR Rule #4: The pilot has the auto-flight system FMS-coupled as much as possible.  This lowest priority rule, 
perhaps better described as a guideline, is intended to maximize the proportion of aircraft on a 4D trajectory, i.e., 
‘strategic’  flight, while  providing  the  pilot with  the  flexibility  to  operate  in  ‘tactical’  flight when  necessary,  i.e., 
using just MCP guidance.  Aircraft flown using FMS guidance are anticipated to have more predictable and stable 
trajectories, thereby benefitting all operators and controllers using that airspace.  AFR pilots are therefore 
encouraged to fly with the FMS engaged to the greatest extent reasonably achievable, and right-of-way preference 
will be given over those in a tactical flight mode.  
The role of the ANSP in homogeneous AFR operations 
is primarily that of a strategic airspace resources manager.  
This role comes into play where contention exists for 
limited-capacity airspace resources, most commonly the 
arrival to busy terminal airspace.  The ANSP manages this 
flow by establishing a meter list and communicating RTAs 
to AFR aircraft.  Aircraft unable to meet their RTA are 
resequenced or redirected to a different arrival fix.  The 
controller does not have any role in separating AFR 
aircraft.   
 
3. F light Deck AFR Tool 
The AFR pilot depends on significant support from a 
suite of automation capabilities integrated into the 
aircraft’s avionics system, i.e., the AFR tool.  Each of the 
AFR rules described above requires supporting automation 
functionality.  In general terms, the AFR tool maintains 
active predictions of the ownship trajectory and those of 
all traffic aircraft within reception range, and it continually 
probes for traffic-to-ownship conflicts.  For each detected 
conflict, right-of-way rules are applied to determine the 
burdened aircraft which in turn determines which aircraft 
is alerted first.  At the appropriate time, the tool alerts the 
pilot to the conflict through displays (Fig. 2) and audible 
 
 
F igure 2. Navigation display showing a conflict 
(white) and a resolution (blue). 
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alerts.  It also actively interprets flight crew inputs to the auto-flight system indicating a crew-proposed trajectory 
change or maneuver, and it  indicates any resulting “provisional” conflicts prior to execution.  For active conflicts, 
the tool produces resolution alternatives in the form of strategic (FMS) and/or tactical (MCP) actions for pilot 
review and selection.  When time to LOS is short, the tool will favor tactical resolutions over strategic resolutions to 
ensure the flight crew has sufficient time to implement the resolution.  In the process, any deviations from ATC 
constraints in effect are minimized, with the priority given to the safety objective of maintaining separation.  
Additional tool functionality supports the pilot in achieving constraint conformance and in reestablishing a conflict-
free strategic route from tactical flight.  These capabilities will be described in more detail in Section III, Simulation 
Descriptions, Flight Deck Automation System for Separation. 
C . Comparative Discussion of the Operational Concepts 
In contrast to current-day operations, the two operational concepts investigated in this function allocation study 
bear a mutual similarity of substantially enhancing the role of automation in separating aircraft.  Although the 
airborne and ground-based automation system functions have many similarities, their designs are necessarily 
different for several reasons.  For example, their information sources differ.  The ground automation has uniform 
quality information of all aircraft in its domain.  Its source for state information is ADS-B, the same as for the 
airborne automation.  However, since it does not have access to the real-time performance data in the FMS of each 
aircraft and does not use TCP broadcast information to reconstruct trajectories, it generates trajectories based on 
estimates of aircraft performance and on previous trajectory amendments sent to the aircraft.  Since the ground 
automation initiates or approves all trajectory amendments, it includes active and pending trajectories into its 
processing, whereas the airborne system processes only currently active trajectories for all traffic aircraft.  
 The airborne automation system, through access  to  its  own  aircraft’s  avionics  systems, has certain aircraft-
specific information not always available to ground systems.  Onboard information, such as airframe and engine 
performance data, current weight, auto-flight settings, and measured atmospheric data, as well as information from 
ground systems on predicted winds, is used to predict trajectories with the highest possible accuracy.  For traffic 
trajectory predictions, the automation reconstructs trajectories from TCPs generated by the avionics systems of the 
traffic aircraft (also with high accuracy).  However, traffic trajectory predictions have reduced fidelity than ownship 
trajectory predictions because of assumptions made about the other aircraft’s flight in between the broadcast TCPs.  
Additionally, the ground automation uses primarily the planned trajectory, which describes the trajectory the aircraft 
will fly if the flight crew makes all the inputs necessary to follow this trajectory, whereas the airborne system uses 
the so-called command-trajectory, which describes the trajectory the aircraft will fly if no further pilot inputs are 
made. These differences in information source can drive design differences between the airborne and ground-based 
automation systems which must be considered when comparing their performance.   
Another difference to be considered between the concepts is the human role in the separation function.  In both 
concepts, conflict detection is solely performed by the automation system, and neither the controllers in the ground-
based concept nor the pilots in the airborne concept are responsible for detecting conflicts, nor are they liable for 
conflicts not detected or detected too late for resolution.  Indeed, this point of similarity places a burden on 
automation systems development and distinguishes these two concepts from current day operations more than 
perhaps any other.   From here, however, a difference emerges between the concepts in the human role.  In the 
ground-based concept, most conflicts are fully resolved by the automation without knowledge or review by a human 
(the controller).  The controller becomes involved if there is an exception presented to him or her by the automation, 
but these events are expected to be infrequent in a fully-equipped environment.  The pilots in the ground-based 
concept would of course be aware of the trajectory change but would have no direct role or responsibility in the 
separation function (just like today).  In the airborne concept, every conflict which the automation detects and 
presents will have the attention and involvement of a human (the pilot of the aircraft requiring a trajectory change), 
although one human will not have awareness of every conflict as in today’s operations.  The pilot’s involvement is 
generally to execute one of the resolutions provided by the automation.  At this point, the pilots’ procedural duties in 
both concepts merge, i.e., execute the conflict resolution trajectory (or select from a small set) provided by the 
automation. 
I I I . Simulation Descriptions 
The airborne and ground-based concept experiments for this function allocation research activity were conducted 
during March 2010 in separate laboratories.  The laboratories and simulation platforms are described, followed by a 
discussion of the implications of using separate laboratories for comparative function allocation research. 
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A . G round-based Concept Simulation: A irspace Operations Laboratory 
The ground-based concept simulation was conducted in the Airspace Operations Laboratory (AOL) at the NASA 
Ames Research Center, in Moffett Field, California.9 The AOL specializes in developing and evaluating advanced 
concepts and technologies for NextGen air traffic control and management. The AOL currently investigates 
operational concepts in the areas of Airspace Super Density Operations, Dynamic Airspace Configuration, Multi 
Sector Planning and Separation Assurance/Functional Allocation.10 The AOL can currently be configured with 
workstations for up to 10 air traffic controllers, 2 supervisors, 4 traffic management coordinators, 4 confederate 
controllers, and 10 simulation pilots. The AOL is currently expanding to increase this simulation capacity by 
approximately 70 percent to enable parallel simulations for different focus areas as well as integrated cross facility 
simulations. 
 
1. Simulation Platform 
The AOL uses the Multi Aircraft Control System (MACS) with its networking supplement Aeronautical Data 
link and Radar Simulator (ADRS) as its simulation and rapid prototyping software.11 This software is developed and 
maintained by AOL engineers and distributed to partners in government, industry and academia.  The existing suite 
of capabilities allows researchers to configure a wide range of air traffic environments, from accurately emulating 
current-day operations to simulating many of the operations envisioned for NextGen as well as the transitional 
stages in between. MACS provides high-fidelity display emulations for air traffic controllers and managers as well 
as user interfaces and displays for confederate pilots and flight crew participants, and experiment managers, 
analysts, and observers. Scenario and target generation capabilities are also built into MACS, which are used to 
generate and run traffic problems tailored to the specified research project. The integrated data collection system is 
used to collect the quantitative measures of interest at each operator station as well as overall traffic progression, 
including aircraft states, conflicts, and sector counts.  
In order to provide the required automation support to the controller, a new NextGen ATC workstation prototype 
was developed based upon an emulation of the operational en-route controller system. The workstation provides 
access to key functions that support the operator in managing high traffic densities effectively. Figure 1 earlier in 
this paper shows the controller display as implemented in 
MACS that was used for this research. 
For this study, the AOL was configured with two 
participant control rooms, each hosting four air traffic 
control sector positions and one supervisor position. Four 
high and low altitude confederate controllers managed 
traffic flows in and out of the test sectors, and 10 general 
aviation pilots operated the aircraft throughout the test 
airspace. During the study runs, the two control rooms 
were run independently  in  separate  “worlds,”  each  with 
their own confederate controllers and simulation pilots.  
Figure 3 shows part of one of the air traffic control rooms 
during the study. Radar associate controllers (D-sides) 
were not staffed; each workstation shown was for one 
sector worked by a single radar controller (R-side). Figure 
3 also shows the overall traffic situation projected on the 
wall. This wall display is configured and controlled by the 
supervisor behind the controller position. 
 
2. Ground-Based Automation System for Separation 
The ground side automation system prototype used in this simulation represents a synergy between Erzberger’s 
work on ground-based automated separation assurance 8, 12 and  the  AOL’s  prior  human-in-the-loop research on 
interactive NextGen air traffic control technologies.13 Erzberger’s Advanced Airspace Concept is theoretically 
designed to provide fully automated separation assurance and air traffic control operations. The technologies 
developed in the AOL with the help of many controller-in-the-loop simulations were designed as highly responsive 
semi-automated decision support tools. The resulting superset of these tools enables simulating a wide range of 
concepts for functional allocation between the controller and the automation. As indicated before, this simulation 
used a cooperative allocation of functions between the ground automation and the controller.  
The ground automation created flight plan-based trajectory predictions for all aircraft from their present position 
to the destination airport. A conformance monitoring function compared each aircraft’s actual position and velocity 
 
 
F igure 3. A ir traffic control room in the N ASA 
Ames A irspace Operations Laboratory . 
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vector to its flight plan trajectory. When vertical non-conformance was detected, the trajectory generation process 
used estimates of the current vertical rate and the aircraft supplied target altitude to generate the prediction. When an 
aircraft was in lateral non-conformance, or  in other words “off-track,” the automation used the aircraft’s supplied 
target heading to generate a flight state-based trajectory prediction for the next five minutes. Off-track aircraft create 
an undesirable state because the system has no medium term trajectory prediction. These aircraft were indicated 
prominently to the controllers, highlighting a need for implementing a new trajectory for the aircraft. For trajectory-
based concepts, ideally all aircraft are in lateral and vertical conformance so that their active trajectories are highly 
predictable.  
The ground-based automation system consisted of a layered separation management approach of strategic and 
tactical capabilities.  All currently active trajectory predictions were tested within each conflict detection cycle as to 
whether a LOS was likely to occur within the next ten minutes. If a conflict was first detected between four and ten 
minutes to initial LOS, the system invoked the strategic  “autoresolver”12 to determine the best overall conflict 
resolution according to its built-in heuristics. The conflict resolution tried to avoid traffic and meet any potential 
time constraints. In this study, if a resolution did not change altitude more than 2200 feet, change heading more than 
60 degrees, violate a time constraint, or if unconstrained, cause an overall flight delay of more than 90 seconds, the 
automation created and sent a data link message to the aircraft that included all parameters that needed to be loaded 
into the aircraft FMS to compute a trajectory that sufficiently matches the ground-based trajectory. The tolerances 
for issuing resolutions automatically were chosen during simulations with retired controllers that were conducted in 
preparation of the study. The ground-based database of flight plans and trajectories was immediately updated so that 
the next conflict probe cycle would no longer flag this conflict and future conflict resolutions could take the new 
trajectory into account.   
If a conflict resolution fell outside these parameters, it was flagged to the controller for review. The controller 
then used semi-automated functions (including the autoresolver) to evaluate different strategic options or approve 
solutions that were outside the tolerances that would have allowed the automation to issue them without controller 
involvement. If a conflict was predicted to occur within less than three minutes, the Tactical Separation Assisted 
Flight Environment (TSAFE)14 module was activated and computed tactical heading changes for one or both of the 
aircraft involved in the conflict. In the current study, the automation sent the heading change(s) at two minutes to 
predicted LOS automatically, and the controller had no means to intervene. Not providing a manual override was an 
experimental design decision rather than part of the operational concept. 
While detection and resolution of traffic conflicts was basically automated in the study, other tasks had to be 
conducted by the controllers using automated aids. One controller task was to manually create and send trajectories 
to put off-track aircraft back on a known trajectory. Another manually initiated task was arrival management. The 
ground-based concept experiment ran a script to use the exact same Scheduled Times of Arrival (STA) as the RTAs 
used in the airborne concept experiment. In order to make sure aircraft adhered to this schedule, controllers could 
invoke a meet time function that would combine the autoresolver logic with a speed advisory function and compute 
a combination of route, altitude, and speed change that would achieve the desired STA on a conflict free path. All 
functions were implemented in MACS. The autoresolver and TSAFE source code modules developed by Erzberger 
and Heere were integrated into the MACS Java code and used the MACS built-in trajectory generation and conflict 
probing functions.  
B . Airborne Concept Simulation: A ir T raffic Operations Laboratory 
The airborne concept simulation was conducted in 
the Air Traffic Operations Laboratory (ATOL) at the 
NASA Langley Research Center, in Hampton, Virginia.  
This facility specializes in simulation-based research 
and development of advanced operational concepts 
employing ADS-B, but it is suitable for a variety of 
traffic operations research.  For conducting batch and 
HITL experiments, it has over 300 computers, including 
12 desktop pilot workstations, four of which are shown 
in Fig. 4. 
 
1. Simulation Platform 
The ATOL computing network hosts the Airspace 
and Traffic Operations Simulation (ATOS) platform.15  
ATOS provides a medium fidelity setting for studying 
 
F igure 4. Pilot workstations in the N ASA Langley 
A ir T raffic Operations Laboratory. 
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the interactions of aircraft in a realistic ADS-B environment.  The simulation networks multiple individual pilot 
stations called Aircraft Simulation for Traffic Operations Research (ASTOR) and a background traffic generator, 
named Traffic Manager (TMX).16  ATOS supports the exchange of industry standard ADS-B reports (i.e., state 
vector, mode status, air referenced velocity, target state, and trajectory change reports) with standard message 
content and broadcast frequency.17  For this experiment, frequency interference modeling was disabled, transmission 
range was fixed at 120 nautical miles (nmi), broadcast rate of key reports was established at 1 Hz, and trajectory 
intent was broadcast up to 12 trajectory change points (i.e., effectively full trajectory intent). 
The traffic aircraft in the experiment scenarios were provided by 12 pilot-station ASTOR computers, 63 batch 
ASTOR computers, and up to 557 lower fidelity aircraft modeled by a single TMX computer.  The function of the 
hundreds of TMX aircraft was to create the required traffic density and to provide ADS-B message broadcasts of 
aircraft performing AFR procedures.  For this purpose, TMX aircraft included capabilities for conflict detection and 
resolution; however, their separation performance was not the subject of the airborne concept experiment. 
Each ASTOR computer simulated one aircraft at medium fidelity.  ASTOR has realistic displays and controls 
representative of a Boeing 777 and a six degree-of-freedom flight performance model representative of a medium-
sized twin-engine transport aircraft.  For the functions required in this experiment, the auto-flight system and FMS 
were fully functional.  Its digital avionics data bus emulates realistic internal and external data communications.18  
ASTOR supports trajectory uplink and auto-load, a capability in this experiment used for loading RTAs.  ASTOR is 
controlled by subject pilots using a desktop computer mouse.  When used in batch mode, a pilot model 
automatically operates the flight controls in real time according to standard AFR procedures.   
Since all aircraft in this experiment were AFR, and no aircraft entered terminal airspace during the simulation 
runs, no interactive ATC simulation component was required to accomplish the experiment objectives.  Though 
ATC would normally assign schedule constraints dynamically, RTAs were predetermined for this experiment and 
sent as scripted data link messages at scheduled times during the appropriate scenarios.  Each scenario contained 63 
aircraft with destination airports in common with the 12 subject pilot ASTORs.  These 63 aircraft were ASTORs 
flown by the pilot model. 
 
2. F light Deck Automation System for Separation 
ASTOR contains a research-prototype ASAS, an AFR tool for the pilot called the Autonomous Operations 
Planner (AOP).19  The AOP supplied the self-separation automation functions necessary for the pilot to meet the 
aforementioned four AFR rules: (1) resolve conflicts when notified, (2) check and clear all trajectory changes for 
conflicts before executing, (3) conform to ATC constraints, and (4) remain FMS-coupled whenever possible.  The 
method of automation support for each rule follows. 
Supporting AFR Rule #1, the AOP automated the process of conflict detection and crew notification by making 
trajectory predictions of the ownship and all traffic aircraft within ADS-B reception range, and by probing these 
trajectories for predicted LOS.  A nominal look-ahead horizon of 10 minutes was used for detection, and the 
trajectory predictions were refreshed at least every 10 seconds.  Buffers were applied to all trajectory segments to 
encompass prediction errors and minimize missed alerts.20  The AOP notified the pilot of conflicts using textual, 
aural, and graphical methods, and at a time and notification level appropriate to the ownship aircraft’s right-of-way 
and the conflict’s level of urgency.  A staggered notification scheme was used to provide implicit coordination and 
minimize simultaneous resolution actions by both aircraft.  
Also for AFR Rule #1, the AOP automated the process of computing acceptable resolutions to a conflict.  Using 
a layered separation management approach similar to the ground-based concept, two methods were available to the 
pilot: strategic and tactical.21, 22  A strategic resolution is a modification of the FMS route, and in most situations, 
both lateral and vertical alternatives are computed.   For each of these alternatives, a pattern-based genetic algorithm 
determined the fuel-optimal solution, and the pilot could upload either option to the FMS for execution.  Figure 2 
shows a Level 1 traffic conflict notification and an AOP-computed lateral strategic resolution that is ready for 
upload and execution in the FMS.  To execute a vertical resolution, the pilot must also reset the MCP altitude 
window appropriately for the new altitude.  A tactical resolution is a maneuver activated by the pilot typically 
through MCP  ‘track  select’  or  ‘flight  level  change’  commands.    The  AOP  will  typically  offer  both  lateral  and 
vertical alternatives, computed by sweeping through possible track, altitude, and vertical speed changes until a 
conflict-free maneuver is found.  At five or four minutes until LOS for the give-way and priority aircraft, 
respectively,  the AOP will  enter  ‘tactical  override’ mode  and offer  only  tactical  resolutions,  given  the  short  time 
remaining to resolve the conflict. 
To help pilots meet AFR Rule #2 (i.e., clear all trajectory changes before executing), the AOP probed 
‘provisional’  or  “what  if…”  trajectories  or  maneuvers  prior  to  execution.  ‘Planning’  conflict  symbology  was 
displayed that indicated whether the proposed change would create a conflict and at what notification level.  With 
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this capability, pilots could safely investigate both FMS strategic trajectory changes and MCP tactical maneuvers 
before executing them.  In addition, to increase situation awareness, yellow bands were displayed on the flight 
displays to indicate ranges of tracks and vertical speeds that should not be selected since their selection would result 
in a Level 2 conflict for the ownship or another aircraft.  Figure 2 shows such a ‘maneuver restriction band’ on the 
compass rose of the navigation display.  
AFR Rule #3 (i.e., conform to ATC constraints) was supported with a combination of FMS and AOP 
capabilities.  The FMS evaluated any required waypoint constraints, such as an RTA, and notified the pilot if the 
aircraft could not meet a given constraint with speed changes alone, e.g. too much delay to absorb by simply 
slowing down.   The AOP then provided  the capability  to ‘resolve’  this  ‘unable RTA’ situation with path changes 
using the same strategic resolution capability used for resolving traffic conflicts.  In this experiment, only lateral 
‘Resolve RTA’ solutions were enabled.   
The AOP supported the pilot with adherence to AFR Rule #4 (i.e., remain FMS-coupled whenever possible) by 
providing a ‘strategic reconnect’ capability.  This function was to be used following an MCP tactical maneuver that 
took the aircraft off its FMS path or cruise altitude.  The AOP would construct a nominal reconnect path and probe it 
for conflicts, providing as well the capability to resolve them.  It would also provide the pilot with guidance 
regarding the MCP settings required to again become ‘fully coupled’ to FMS guidance. 
C . Comparative Discussion of the Simulation Environments 
Conducting function allocation research in separate laboratories has advantages and disadvantages.  The primary 
benefit is that each concept may be tested at the highest available fidelity for that concept, an important 
consideration for HITL safety-related operations research.  Testing at higher fidelity means that the controllers in the 
ground-based concept or the pilots in the airborne concept will each use realistic and fully functioning interfaces and 
automation functionality, which allows them to better assess the strengths and weaknesses a particular concept 
would have in an operational setting.  Comparing ground-based and airborne concepts in a single simulation 
platform is expensive to accomplish and would typically result in either (1) lower fidelity but balanced 
representation of both concepts with many simplifying assumptions, or (2) unbalanced representation of the 
concepts, with one concept being significantly compromised relative to the other because the higher fidelity 
platforms have favored either the ground side or airborne side in their development.  For this study, the ground-
based concept was tested in the same environment in which it was matured through prior human-in-the-loop studies: 
a high fidelity control room with workstations equipped with advanced automation aids.   The airborne concept was 
also tested in the same environment in which it was developed and matured: multiple pilot stations with higher 
fidelity flight-deck interfaces, avionics functionality, and aircraft modeling.  
A disadvantage of testing in separate environments is the unavoidable dissimilarity in modeling, an inherent 
result of the independent development history of the simulation platforms.  For example, differences existed 
between MACS and ATOS (specifically the AOP) in the time at which tactical conflict resolution overrode strategic 
conflict resolution.  In the ground-based automation, TSAFE was used starting at three minutes prior to LOS.  In the 
AOP, the tactical override capability was used starting at four or five minutes prior to LOS, depending on right-of-
way.  These timings were considered integral to the design of each automation system and therefore were not 
candidates for synchronization.  In another example, different methods used to account for trajectory prediction 
uncertainty.  MACS added buffers to the separation standards, whereas the AOP placed buffers around trajectory 
segments and probed for separation loss between the buffers.  The two approaches are fundamentally different and 
could not be made equivalent for this study.  However, sources of uncertainty (e.g. wind errors) were minimized 
where possible to mitigate the difference.   
A successful effort was made to make the descent profile characteristics of the MACS aircraft similar to the 
aircraft that were used as piloted ASTORS in the Langley experiment. In order to match the arrival profiles of the 
piloted ASTORs, the MACS B757 performance model was adjusted until the aircraft in both simulations flew 
almost identical descent paths and achieved comparable flight times from their initial position to the arrival fix, thus 
making arrival time comparisons more meaningful. 
Where other modeling assumptions differed, compensations were made where possible.  An example is the 
surveillance modeling.  MACS has a higher fidelity RADAR model than ATOS, including modeling of RADAR 
noise and alpha beta tracking that cause realistic delays in position updates and track angle changes.  ATOS has a 
higher fidelity ADS-B model than MACS, including probabilistic range and interference effects.  To promote 
commonality, both MACS and ATOS were set up to use only ADS-B for surveillance, and ATOS used no 
interference modeling and a fixed cutoff range of 120 nm.  In another example, MACS capability to model dynamic 
weather exceeded the capability in ATOS, and therefore the decision was made to remove dynamic weather from 
the common test matrix.  Thus, fidelity was twice sacrificed in the interest of commonality. 
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I V . Exper iment Design Commonality 
The general objective shared by the two experiments was to determine whether human operators can effectively 
operate within the 4D concept under investigation to enable aircraft to safely traverse high density airspace. 
Additional objectives were to assess the acceptability of each concept to the human operators and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of each concept, its function allocation, and its associated technologies.  To assist in the comparability 
of results, the two experiments were designed with as many features in common as possible.  The common aspects 
and those that necessarily differed are described, followed by a discussion of metrics comparability. 
A . Common Aspects 
The aspects of the two experiment designs that were established in common are listed in Table 1.   
1. Airspace and Aircraft  
The experiments modeled the same airspace region, which straddled the eastern portion of Kansas City Center 
(ZKC) and the western portion of Indianapolis Center (ZID).  The domain of interest was high altitude airspace 
above Flight Level (FL) 290.  Figure 5 shows the test airspace. The rectangle indicates the common test airspace. In 
the ground-based experiment, sectors ZKC90, ZKC98, ZID80 and ZID81 were actively managed by air traffic 
controllers. 
Table 1. Common aspects of exper iment designs. 
 
Airspace location and 
dimensions 
Rectangular region over Indianapolis and Kansas City Centers defined by:  
  Latitude N36.5 to N40.5; Longitude W86 to W94; F light Level 290 to 400 
T raffic density 
definition 
1.0x = 18 aircraft per 10,000 nmi2;applied to the entire experiment airspace 
Aircraft types Equivalent aircraft types (e.g. B757-200) per call sign 
T raffic scenarios  Initial states and flight plans of all aircraft 
Environmental 
conditions 
Winds westerly at 30 to 50 knots; Small variations by altitude ;  
No lateral or time variation; No wind forecast error 
Separation standards  Lateral: 5 nmi; Vertical: 1000 ft 
Test matrices and 
scenario durations 
Moderate (M): 2x2 within-subjects design with 2 replicates; eight 30-minute runs 
Short (S): 3x1 within-subjects design with 2 replicates; six 15-minute runs 
Independent 
variables and levels 
M: Traffic density: 1.5x, 2.0x; Scheduling assignment: No RTA/STA, RTA/STA = ETA 
S:  Trajectory change event timing: None, Dispersed, Synchronous 
(F ixed: Traffic density, 2.0x; Scheduling assignment, RTA/STA = ETA) 
T rajectory change 
event 
Uplink of RTA/STA change indicating an arrival delay to be absorbed with a 
trajectory change 
 
 
F igure 5. Common test airspace. 
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Aircraft were permitted to climb to and descend from 
this region, but no aircraft cruised below FL290.  The 
traffic scenarios were designed to approximate current 
day routing between city pairs and used current day 
waypoints.  Traffic density was scaled up from current 
levels by proportionately increasing city-pair departure 
rates to reach the target aircraft counts equivalent to 1.5x 
and 2.0x current day maximum density.  A common 
simplified definition was used for current day maximum 
traffic density, with 1.0x equal to 18 aircraft per 10,000 
nmi2* or 164 aircraft for this airspace.  The traffic density (i.e., aircraft count within the experiment airspace) was 
sustained for the duration of each simulation run by supplying new aircraft as other aircraft exited the airspace.  
Figure 6 shows the sustainment of traffic density within the experiment airspace, and Fig. 7 shows the traffic 
demand within each experiment sector. One item to note is that the experiment airspace encompassed a larger area 
or volume than the four test sectors. Therefore, while traffic density was controlled to be more or less uniform on 
average in the experiment airspace, a difference in aircraft count between the ATC sectors naturally occurred, as 
shown in Fig. 7.  This difference in aircraft count led to significant variations in the traffic environment in each 
sector.  Similarly, each subject aircraft in the airborne experiment flew through a different part of the experiment 
airspace and was therefore exposed to a unique traffic environment ranging from light to heavy traffic density.  
Therefore, variation between results for each sector and each subject-aircraft are expected. 
The aircraft in the two experiments’ scenarios matched call sign by call sign, including aircraft type and initial 
conditions (i.e., initial position, altitude, speed, heading, and flight plan).  Only the initial conditions can be 
guaranteed to match, since any trajectory or altitude change by any aircraft thereafter will affect how the remainder 
of the scenario unfolds.  The two simulations were configured to use the same wind field, which was chosen to be 
laterally uniform, unchanging, and relatively mild.  Although both simulations were capable of including differences 
between truth and predicted winds, wind error was not included to reduce testing time.  The two simulations also 
assumed current day en-route separation standards were in effect. 
 
2. Test Matrices and Scenario Definitions 
The experiments shared two common test matrices,  the  “M” matrix, consisting of moderate duration  (30 minute) 
scenarios, and the “S” matrix, consisting of short duration (15 minute) scenarios.  The objective of the M matrix was 
to enable an assessment of nominal operations under different traffic loads and trajectory constraints.  The test 
matrix, shown in Fig. 8, was a 2x2 within-subject design that varied traffic density (1.5x vs. 2.0x) and the inclusion 
of a scheduling assignment, i.e., an arrival time constraint (not included vs. included).  The arrival time constraint 
was an STA in the ground-based experiment and an RTA in the airborne experiment set approximately equal to the 
aircraft’s Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) at the arrival metering fix.  When included, the scheduling assignment 
was enacted in the airborne experiment by sending a data link message to the 75 aircraft arriving to seven common 
airports in the vicinity of the experiment region. In the ground-based experiment the scheduled times were entered 
                                                          
* In rough terms, this value was considered representative of a typical MAP value for a typical en-route sector size. 
 
 
F igure 6. T raffic density sustained across the 
exper iment airspace during the 1.5x and 2.0x scenarios. 
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F igure 7. A ircraft count over time in the four A T C 
sectors during the 1.5x and 2.0x scenarios. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
A
ve
ra
ge
 N
um
be
r 
of
 
A
ir
cr
af
t  
in
 S
ec
to
r
Time (min)
1.5X
ZID 80 ZID 81 ZKC 90 ZKC 98
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
A
ve
ra
ge
 N
um
be
r 
of
 
A
ir
cr
af
t  
in
 S
ec
to
r
Time (min)
2.0X
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
15 
into the ground automation as meter times. Both 
experiments ran automated scripts to control the 
timing and exact values of these assignments. The 
2x2 matrix contained two replicates for a total of 
eight scenario runs that each lasted 30 minutes.   
The objective of the S matrix was to enable an 
assessment of the concept agility to large numbers 
of trajectory changes.  The matrix, shown in Fig. 
9, was a 3x1 within-subject design that varied a 
trajectory change event. The fixed conditions 
were a traffic density of 2.0x and the inclusion of 
an initial scheduling assignment approximately 
equal to the ETA.   
The trajectory change event was a revision of 
the scheduling assignment representing an arrival 
delay of four to six minutes and was enacted in 
the same way as the scheduling assignments in 
the M scenarios.  In addition to the baseline 
condition which excluded the event, the 
assignments were made at either dispersed times 
or synchronous times among the 75 affected aircraft.  In the dispersed condition, no two aircraft received their 
arrival delay at the same time, whereas in the synchronous condition, all 75 aircraft received their new assignments 
at the same time. In the ground-based experiment, the new STAs were indicated in the controllers’ arrival timelines, 
prompting them to initiate a trajectory change to absorb the delay.  In the airborne experiment, the receipt of the 
arrival delay message by each aircraft triggered the process of generating a delay-absorbing maneuver (i.e., a path 
stretch) resulting in a trajectory change.  For operational realism, only the timing of the initiating event was 
controlled, not the timing of the actual trajectory changes. Differences in the procedures and tools between the two 
concepts affected the timing of the actual trajectory changes relative to the initiating event. 
B . Differ ing Aspects 
Other aspects of the two experiment designs were necessarily different.  These aspects are listed in Table 2 and 
discussed in the subsequent sections. 
 
Table 2. Differ ing aspects of exper iment design. 
 
 Ground-based Concept Experiment Airborne Concept Experiment 
Subjects Controllers (sectors and supervisors) Pilots (single operator, no crew) 
Subject quantity 2 independent groups; 5 controllers per 
group; 1 group = 4 sector controllers, 1 
area supervisor 
4 independent groups; 12 pilots per group 
 
Subject total 
participation time 
2 groups simultaneously in 2 independent  
‘sector worlds’; single 8-day session  
1 group per week for 4 weeks; each week 
contained one 3-day session  
T raining time on 
concept, 
procedures  
3 days with 10 hours of hands-on training 1 day with 5 hours of hands-on training 
Aircraft 
monitored by 
subject 
participants 
4 airspace sectors (ZKC90, ZKC98, 
ZID80, ZID81) traversed by hundreds of 
aircraft per scenario; the remaining 
airspace was monitored by confederate 
controllers 
12 aircraft per scenario; all remaining 
aircraft were automated and not piloted by 
humans 
Scenario difficulty 
and conflicts 
exper ienced  
Varied by sector assignment, between 
runs, and within runs 
Varied by aircraft assignment, between 
runs, and within runs 
 
Scheduling 
Assignment 
No  
(baseline) M1 M2 
Yes  
(STA/RTA) M4 M3 
  1.5x 2.0x 
  Traffic Density 
F igure 8. Design matrix for the 30-minute M scenarios. 
Timing of  
STA/RTA 
Rescheduling 
None / Baseline  
(STA/RTA unchanged) S1 
Dispersed Timing 
(one aircraft every 10 seconds) S2 
Synchronous  Timing 
(all aircraft at once) S3 
F igure 9. Design matrix for the 15-minute S scenarios.  
Traffic density was 2.0x in all three conditions of this matrix. 
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1. Subjects 
Each HITL experiment recruited human subject participants most relevant for its concept: certified professional 
controllers for the ground-based concept and active commercial transport pilots for the airborne concept.  Neither 
experiment involved both subject controllers and subject pilots.   
In the ground-based experiment, trajectory amendments sent from the ground automation to aircraft were 
automatically executed; therefore no subject pilots were required for the experiment.  Aircraft receiving tactical 
instructions did require human execution, but these actions were accomplished by non-subject general aviation 
pseudo-pilots.  Pseudo-pilots were not considered a source of experimental data.  Ten pseudo-pilots were present, 
each responsible for controlling between 10 and 70 aircraft within the test airspace and several hundred in the 
surrounding airspace.  In addition, eight retired controllers served as confederates, controlling the airspace 
surrounding the subject-controller sectors.  The confederate controllers were also not considered a source of 
experimental data. 
In the airborne experiment, the only required ANSP (i.e., groundside) role involved the assignment and 
transmission of RTA constraints to the aircraft.  Since these constraints were predetermined and fixed, the 
transmission could be easily scripted; hence no subject controllers were required for the airborne experiment.  The 
pilots participated as single operators with no crew.   
 
2. Subject Quantity, Total Participation Time, and Training Time 
An unequal number of subjects participated in the two experiments, and the length of subject participation 
(including training) was different as well.  The subject pools for the ground-based and airborne experiments were 10 
controllers and 48 pilots, respectively.  To collect data efficiently, each pool was divided into groups, and each 
group participated together in the same scenarios.   
In the ground-based experiment, two groups of five controllers participated simultaneously in separate but 
identically configured four-sector  simulation  ‘worlds.’  In each world,  the  sectors were  staffed with one controller 
each plus one additional controller as the area supervisor.  The controllers were available for a single, common eight 
work-day period.  Therefore, training, data collection, questionnaires, and debrief were scheduled during this period.  
Training was accomplished over three days, including 10 hours of hands-on training.  This time period included 
additional data runs external to the common M and S test matrices described here.  Results from these additional 
runs will be reported in separate publications. 
In the airborne experiment, groups of 12 pilots participated in three-day sessions.  Four sessions were scheduled 
over consecutive weeks, each with a different group of pilots, for a total of 48 pilots.  Two pilots were retroactively 
excluded from data analysis because of lack of recent flying experience, resulting in a pool of 46 pilots for data 
analysis.  The pilots’ qualifications are described in Ref. 23. Since the pilots served as subject participants during 
their days off from flying the line, their maximum availability was three days onsite at Langley.  Therefore, all 
training, data collection, questionnaires, and debriefing had to be completed during this time.  The pilots received 
one day of training, including five hours of hands-on training, supplemented by pre-mailed reading material.  During 
data runs, each group of pilots simultaneously flew their aircraft in shared scenarios, i.e., they piloted 12 of the 
several hundred aircraft operating in the experiment airspace.  The remaining aircraft were automated, i.e., ‘flown’ 
by pilot model software, and they were not considered a valid source of experimental data for this HITL experiment.   
 
3. Aircraft Monitored by Subject Participants 
Even though the two experiments had identical aircraft populations, the subset of aircraft managed by the 
controllers and pilots were necessarily different from one another.  This necessity resulted from different role 
assignments: controllers managing sectors of airspace and pilots flying individual aircraft.  In the ground-based 
experiment, each controller worked aircraft located within their assigned sector with several dozen of the hundreds 
of aircraft receiving human attention.  The four sectors constituted only a subset of the total experimental airspace 
region.  Therefore, portions of the aircraft trajectories flown by the subject pilots lay outside of the four sectors 
controlled by the subject controllers.  In the airborne experiment, each pilot flew one aircraft per scenario, and 
therefore only 12 of the hundreds of aircraft received human attention.  They flew across the experimental airspace 
region, shown in Fig. 5, which was sized to enable 30 minutes of continuous flight.  Since sector boundaries have no 
significance in the airborne concept, the ATC sectors played no role in the experiment other than to provide a 
common reference for joint data analysis.   
 
4. Scenario Difficulty 
The scenario difficulty experienced by the controller and pilot populations was defined by their dissimilar 
domains of control, i.e., within a sector for a controller and along a single trajectory for a pilot.  Additionally, the 
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difficulty varied among controllers and among pilots.  Each controller’s experience in each run was defined by the 
unique flow patterns and local traffic densities of their sector, which were determined to be significantly non-
uniform across sectors and across time. Therefore, the FAA-supplied controllers were rotated through the three more 
complex sectors (ZKC90, ZKC98, and ZID81) and the supervisor position.  A recently retired controller worked the 
fourth sector (ZID80).  Similarly, each subject pilot flew different aircraft in the same scenarios, which meant they 
had dissimilar experiences depending on their trajectory relative to the surrounding traffic (e.g., number and types of 
conflicts).  Although they rotated through a common set of 24 aircraft across the complete set of 14 scenarios*, in 
any one scenario (i.e., test condition), some pilots had busy flights whereas others had few or no conflicts.  Both of 
these outcomes were a byproduct of the random scenario generation process and the naturally non-uniform 
characteristics of the traffic patterns in the selected airspace region.   
Although the two experiments shared the same initial conditions of each scenario, it was not possible to 
guarantee that the two experiments would produce the same traffic conflicts.  In fact, the probability was low that 
the same conflicts would appear, given that the operational concepts are founded on flexible use of the airspace.  
Once a trajectory is changed for any reason, the scenario unfolds differently.  For instance, since the controllers 
participated primarily in an exception-handling role, they were less apt to adjust trajectories without a reason such as 
a conflict.  However, the subject pilots in the airborne experiment were free to adjust their altitude and routing to 
their preference, provided that they created no conflicts in the process.  In either concept, conflict resolutions early 
in the scenario altered encounters later in the scenario.  In addition, the ground-based concept adhered to the cardinal 
altitudes, whereas the airborne concept permitted pilots to cruise at altitudes other than 1000-ft cardinal altitudes.  
The pilots of the airborne experiment frequently took advantage of this option, which had the unintended effect of 
increasing their exposure to conflicts since the aircraft without subject pilots remained at the cardinal altitudes. 
V . Results and Discussion 
Selecting metrics to compare two very different concepts tested in different simulation platforms was a 
significant challenge and is expected to see improvement with each subsequent conduct of common simulations.  
Some metrics support limited comparability whereas others, while important to present, should not be directly 
compared.  The following categories of metrics are presented in this paper, and in the following subsections, each is 
introduced in terms of suitability for comparison.  
 
A. System Performance and Safety: Conflict detection; Time to LOS at initial detection and final clearing; 
Conflict resolution; and LOS events 
B. Efficiency: F light path deviation; and Schedule conformance 
C. Subjective Assessments: Workload ratings; and Ratings of the operational concept and procedures. 
 
It is important to note that in this initial set of experiments, not all data from the simulations were considered 
valid for comparison.  In the ground-based experiment, the performance of the confederate controllers and pseudo-
pilots were excluded from analysis.  Otherwise, since all aircraft were modeled at the same fidelity and were 
controlled by the same automation system, the metrics were collected for all aircraft across the airspace.  However, 
comparisons between the two concepts were restricted to the aircraft flown by the subject-pilots in the airborne 
experiment and, in the case of conflict metrics, to conflicts occurring in the test sectors staffed by air traffic 
controllers in the ground-based experiment. During the data collection for the ground-based experiment, the 
controllers had no knowledge that a subset of aircraft would be used for a special data analysis. Unlike the airborne 
experiment, all aircraft in the ground-based simulation were simulated in the same way by MACS, and the aircraft 
used for comparison in this paper received no added attention or treatment by the controllers, the automation, or the 
simulation systems.   
In the airborne experiment, the only qualifying aircraft for data analysis were the 12 ASTOR aircraft in each 
scenario flown by the subject pilots.  The remaining aircraft (batch ASTORs and TMX aircraft) provided the 
necessary background traffic but were not considered sufficiently capable and mature to provide data comparable to 
the piloted ASTORs.  The pilot model software for the batch ASTORs was updated with many new capabilities 
needed to conduct the experiment, but its performance with these capabilities was not sufficiently robust for 
analysis.  The TMX aircraft used conflict resolution algorithms that were significantly different and less mature than 
those used in AOP.  The inclusion of these aircraft in the simulation was necessary to reach the high traffic density 
throughout the large experimental airspace.  During the data collection, the subject pilots were not aware of any 
                                                          
* Two different sets of 12 aircraft were flown by pilots in the M and S scenarios, respectively.   
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differences between aircraft in the simulation, although they were aware that only 12 pilots participated at a time and 
that most of the aircraft were automatically controlled. 
A . System Performance and Safety  
System performance and safety results are presented in the areas of conflict detection, conflict resolution, and 
LOS events for the M scenarios.  The conflicts in the S scenarios have not yet been analyzed in detail, but are 
expected to follow similar patterns as the 2.0x M scenarios.  In general, metrics of conflict detection and conflict 
resolution can be loosely compared between the two experiments, while taking note that significant differences 
existed in trajectory modeling and automation design between the two simulations.  The quantity of LOS events 
cannot be directly compared, nor can events be compared between specific aircraft pairs in the two experiments, 
because each LOS was unique to its environment and preceding events.  However, areas of commonality can be 
explored in the general types of causal factors that led to these events. 
 
1. Conflict Detection  
The number of conflicts was counted within the common portion of the two experiments’ reportable data,  i.e., 
conflict detections involving the 12 aircraft flown by pilot participants in the airborne experiment and for which the 
predicted LOS occurred within the four sectors staffed by the controller participants in the ground-based experiment. 
The data presented throughout this section only include 
conflicts that persisted for at least 12 seconds, a 
traditional indication of conflict stability used in AOL 
data analysis.  In addition, a repeated conflict detection 
involving the same pair of aircraft in which the gap 
between active reported times was less than 90 seconds 
was counted as single conflict.   
As shown in Fig. 10, the distribution of conflicts 
between the four ATC sectors was similar for the two 
experiments.  By far, the airspace region with the most 
conflicts was Kansas City Center sector 90.   Table 3 
shows the number of conflict detections and their 
distribution by sector. Sector ZKC 90 had over 30 
percent more conflicts than any other sectors. These 
conflicts were further analyzed, and it was determined 
that many of these resulted from the large number of 
descending and climbing aircraft in this sector. 
The mean number of conflicts detected in each of 
the four M scenarios is shown for the ground-based and 
airborne experiments in Fig. 11, and the descriptive 
statistics are in Table 4.  The ground-
based experiment data show a 
stronger effect of traffic density on 
conflicts detected than did the 
airborne experiment data.  Overall, 
the airborne experiment recorded a 
greater number of detected conflicts.  
An analysis determined that some 
subject pilots occasionally elected to 
change the initial route and/or altitude 
at the beginning of the scenario, a 
pilot authority allowed by the AFR 
concept.  When this occurred, these 
aircraft were effectively exposed to a 
different traffic situation than those 
aircraft that did not make these 
changes.  Since the traffic density was 
not homogeneous throughout the 
airspace, these trajectory and altitude 
Table 3. Conflicts detected in the four A T C sectors. 
 
G round-Based Experiment 
 Density Schedule ZID 80 ZID 81 ZKC 90 ZKC 98 Total 
M1 1.5x No 4 0 5 0 9 
M2 2.0x No 4 9 27 2 42 
M4 1.5x Yes 3 0 5 1 9 
M3 2.0x Yes 1 9 13 9 32 
Overall 12 18 50 12 92 
Overall Percentage 13% 20% 54% 13% 100% 
Airborne Experiment 
 Density Schedule ZID 80 ZID 81 ZKC 90 ZKC 98 Total 
M1 1.5x No 19 13 40 9 81 
M2 2.0x No 15 18 24 7 64 
M4 1.5x Yes 18 12 33 3 66 
M3 2.0x Yes 12 25 62 9 108 
Overall 64 68 159 28 319 
Overall Percentage 20% 21% 50% 9% 100% 
 
 
F igure 10.  Distr ibution of conflicts within the A T C 
sectors.  Conflict location is defined by the predicted 
LOS location. 
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changes may have exposed these aircraft to additional conflicts.  In Fig. 11, the portion of conflicts detected for 
these altered flights is shown as a shaded region.  In the ground-based experiment, which did not include subject 
pilots, these trajectory changes were not made.  Even with this factor taken into account, the airborne experiment 
data still indicate a greater overall number of conflicts detected than the ground-based experiment data.  This result 
may be related to the different techniques used in the two experiments to add uncertainty buffers to conflict 
detection.     
 
2. Time to LOS at Initial Detection and F inal Clearing 
The time to the predicted LOS when conflicts are first detected and finally cleared are two metrics of interest to 
system performance and safety.  The time of first detection is determined primarily by the look-ahead parameter of 
the conflict detection function, which for both experiments was set to 10 minutes, but also by prediction 
uncertainties and aircraft maneuvers that may delay detection.  In terms of system performance and safety, it is 
desired to detect conflicts early enough to have sufficient time to resolve them.  The time of final clearing is 
governed by the time required to request, compute, load, and execute a resolution.  It also is governed by any 
repeated conflicts between the same aircraft pair, as only the final clear time is registered.  In the airborne concept, 
the time at which the conflict is displayed to the pilot is also a factor, because an aircraft with higher priority will 
receive the alert later (if still necessary), giving the burdened aircraft a chance to solve the conflict first.  In terms of 
system performance and safety, it is desired that conflicts be resolved sufficiently far in advance of the predicted 
LOS to minimize the need for urgent tactical actions by the controller or pilot.   
The mean times-to-LOS at first detection and final clearing are shown in Fig. 12 for the M scenarios, and Table 
5 shows the descriptive statistics.  The data included in these plots were derived from the same subset of the total 
conflicts included in the previous conflict count analysis.  In both data sets, the mean times for initial detection and 
final clearing were greater than five minutes to the predicted LOS, indicating generally adequate mean system 
performance.  A greater effect of traffic density is apparent in the ground-based experiment data than for the 
airborne experiment, as indicated by slight reductions in the mean time-to-LOS at first detection and final clearing, 
 
F igure 11.  M ean number of conflicts detected in the M scenarios. Error bars are +/- 1 standard error of the 
mean. Shaded area represents mean conflicts detected in runs for which pilots changed the trajectory or altitude 
at beginning of the scenario.  The maneuvers effectively changed the scenario for these aircraft, making their 
conflict detections less appropriate for comparison. 
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Table 4. Descr iptive statistics for the conflicts detected in the M scenarios. 
 
 G round-Based Experiment A irborne Experiment 
 Density Schedule Mean SD StdErr Mean SD StdErr 
M1 1.5x No 2.25 0.50 0.25 10.60 4.46 1.58 
M2 2.0x No 10.50 0.58 0.29 8.33 3.64 1.29 
M4 1.5x Yes 2.25 1.26 0.63 8.60 3.60 1.27 
M3 2.0x Yes 8.00 2.16 1.08 14.23 5.85 2.07 
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as traffic density was increased from 1.5x to 2.0x.  However, overall, the conflicts in the ground-based experiment 
were detected and resolved earlier than those in the airborne experiment.  Nearly all subject-aircraft conflicts in the 
airborne experiment occurred with TMX aircraft, and a review of data revealed software faults in TMX that, in 
many cases, delayed the timely detection and resolution of conflicts by either aircraft in the conflict.  These faults 
included the broadcast of incorrect target-state altitudes, which significantly affected the AOP’s accuracy in conflict 
detection, and incorrect filtering out of conflicts by TMX (for reducing computational load to enable the large total 
aircraft count), which reduced TMX aircraft participation in detecting and resolving conflicts.  These effects resulted 
in some conflicts being detected and resolved with less time than intended by the system design.  As will be 
discussed in the next section, these software faults also resulted in some instances of LOS.  Finally, as expected, the 
inclusion of schedule constraints had little effect on the timing of the detection and resolution of conflicts. 
 
3. Conflict Resolution  
Figure 13 shows the distribution of conflict resolutions among the four ATC sectors.  The accompanying data is 
in Table 6.  As expected, the data parallel the distribution of the conflicts themselves (Fig. 10) and indicate that the 
airspace corresponding to sector 90 was the busiest airspace for trajectory changes in both experiments.  It should be 
noted, however, that the aircraft may not have actually been in the sector of the predicted LOS location when the 
conflict resolution occurred, and the resolution maneuver itself may not have always been within the sector.  Sector 
boundaries are not part of the airborne concept and were not, therefore, represented to the pilots or the AOP in the 
experiment. 
   
F igure 12.  Mean initial and final times to L OS for conflicts in the M scenarios. Error bars are +/- 1 standard 
error of the mean.   
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Table 5. Descr iptive statistics for the initial and final times to L OS for conflicts in the M scenarios. 
 
G round-Based Experiment 
 Initial Detection Final Clear 
 Density Schedule N Mean SD StdErr N Mean SD StdErr 
M1 1.5x No 9 8.49 3.10 1.03 9 8.16 2.99 1.00 
M2 2.0x No 42 7.68 2.71 0.42 42 7.19 2.75 0.42 
M4 1.5x Yes 9 8.47 1.84 0.61 9 8.07 1.98 0.66 
M3 2.0x Yes 32 7.54 2.46 0.43 32 6.26 2.78 0.49 
Airborne Experiment 
 Initial Detection Final Clear 
 Density Schedule N Mean SD StdErr N Mean SD StdErr 
M1 1.5x No 81 6.95 2.91 0.32 81 6.12 2.57 0.29 
M2 2.0x No 64 6.78 2.96 0.37 64 5.68 2.48 0.31 
M4 1.5x Yes 65 7.21 2.84 0.35 65 6.33 2.72 0.34 
M3 2.0x Yes 109 6.71 2.95 0.28 109 5.66 2.55 0.24 
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Figure 14 presents the mean conflict resolution count for the ground-based and airborne experiments, using the 
same subset of data described for the conflict detection analysis above (i.e., M scenarios only, conflicts involving 
subject-piloted aircraft, with predicted LOS in ATC sectors, having at least 12 second duration, and separated by at 
least 90 seconds from other conflicts same-run/same-pair aircraft). Table 7 shows the resolutions by ATC sector and 
type of resolution in the ground-based experiment, and Table 8 shows similar data for the airborne experiment.  The 
plot indicates the total number of resolutions for each experimental condition, as well as the proportion of strategic 
and tactical resolutions.  The total number of resolutions mirrors the conflict detection trends depicted in Fig. 11, as 
expected, although fewer resolutions were recorded in the airborne experiment relative to the ground-based 
experiment during the 2.0x traffic density conditions.  This result is consistent with the distributed nature of the 
airborne concept, in which the traffic aircraft resolves some of the conflicts.  In the airborne experiment, the data 
reflect only the resolutions of the subject-piloted aircraft and not those of the traffic aircraft, whereas the ground-
based experiment data reflect resolutions by both aircraft. 
In the ground-based experiment, tactical resolutions were not observed in the 1.5x traffic density condition and 
were a small proportion of resolutions in the 2.0x traffic density condition.  In the airborne experiment, tactical 
resolutions occurred in each test condition and were a larger proportion overall.  The airborne system had two 
tactical modes: tactical and tactical override.  The tactical (non-override) mode was a normal mode used for conflict 
resolution whenever the auto-flight system was not fully coupled to the FMS or was predicted to decouple within 
 
F igure 13.  Distr ibution of resolutions for conflicts occurring within the A T C sectors.  Conflict location is 
defined by the predicted LOS location. 
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Table 6. Resolutions for conflicts in the four A T C sectors. 
 
G round-Based Experiment 
 Density Schedule ZID 80 ZID 81 ZKC 90 ZKC 98 Total 
M1 1.5x No 4 0 4 0 8 
M2 2.0x No 3 9 30 2 44 
M4 1.5x Yes 3 0 6 1 10 
M3 2.0x Yes 1 9 14 12 36 
Overall 11 18 54 15 98 
Overall Percentage 11% 18% 55% 15% 100% 
Airborne Experiment 
 Density Schedule ZID 80 ZID 81 ZKC 90 ZKC 98 Total 
M1 1.5x No 11.8 10.4 33.6 8.2 64.0 
M2 2.0x No 10.0 9.6 17.6 4.2 41.4 
M4 1.5x Yes 7.4 5.2 27.0 2.0 41.6 
M3 2.0x Yes 11.6 12.4 25.4 9.0 58.4 
Overall 40.8 37.6 103.6 23.4 205.4 
Overall Percentage 20% 18% 50% 11% 100% 
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AOP’s conflict resolution look-ahead horizon of 20 minutes.  As such, tactical (non-override) resolutions were not 
necessarily an indication of degraded system performance or safety.  The tactical override mode, as its name 
implies, would override any strategic resolutions on the pilot’s display, and the pilot was compelled by procedures to 
execute either the lateral or vertical tactical resolution. This mode is more comparable to the ground-based concept’s 
tactical mode based on the TSAFE algorithm.  However, the airborne tactical override mode was triggered when 
time-to-LOS  was  less  than  five  or  four  minutes,  depending  on  the  aircraft’s  right-of-way, whereas TSAFE was 
triggered when time-to-LOS was less than three minutes.  The greater proportion of tactical override resolutions in 
the airborne experiment data is consistent with the earlier trigger time. 
  
          
F igure 14.  B reakdown of conflict resolution type for conflicts in the M scenarios. The data only include 
conflicts involving subject-piloted aircraft with LOS predicted to occur within the ATC sectors. 
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Table 7. Resolutions for conflicts in the four A T C sectors in the ground-based exper iment.   
 
Tactical Resolutions (TSA F E) 
 Density Schedule ZID 80 ZID 81 ZKC 90 ZKC 98 Total Mean 
M1 1.5x No 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M2 2.0x No 0 0 3 0 3 0.75 
M4 1.5x Yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M3 2.0x Yes 0 0 0 1 1 0.25 
Overall 0 0 3 1 4  
Strategic Resolutions 
 Density Schedule ZID 80 ZID 81 ZKC 90 ZKC 98 Total Mean 
M1 1.5x No 4 0 4 0 8 2.00 
M2 2.0x No 3 9 27 2 41 10.25 
M4 1.5x Yes 3 0 6 1 10 2.50 
M3 2.0x Yes 1 9 14 11 35 8.75 
Overall 11 18 51 14 94  
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4. Loss of Separation Events 
Losses of separation occurred in both experiments.*  However, of the comparable dataset used in the preceding 
conflict analysis (i.e., the aircraft piloted in the airborne experiment with LOS predicted to occur - or in this case 
actually occurring - within the ATC sectors of the ground-based experiment), no LOS events occurred in the 
ground-based experiment runs for these aircraft in these sectors, and six LOS events occurred in the airborne 
experiment runs.  Simulation faults contributed to all but one of these LOS events and will be discussed below.   
As this paper focuses primarily on comparable results, other LOS events will not be discussed here in detail.  In 
the ground-based experiment, other LOS events in the ATC sectors involved aircraft not piloted in the airborne 
experiment.  These will be discussed below in general terms to address some of the contributing factors, and a 
detailed analysis will be available in future publications.23  In the airborne experiment, subject aircraft were involved 
in four additional LOS events occurring outside the ATC sector boundaries.  These will be included in the 
discussion below because the contributing factors were similar to those within the ATC sectors.†    Not discussed for 
either experiment are LOS events occurring outside the ATC sectors in the ground-based experiment or involving 
only non-piloted aircraft in the airborne experiment, as they did not have the full benefit of the respective human-
automation concepts. 
LOS in HITL simulations pinpoint problems that need to be addressed and are rich and important sources of 
information.  The value of a LOS analysis is to assess the causal factors so that improvements in technology and/or 
procedures can be inserted back into the concept.  The following discussions for each experiment illuminate the 
wide variety of factors that resulted in LOS, from complex traffic flow interactions to simulation software faults to 
human procedural errors. 
 
Ground-Based Experiment LOS 
Of the subset of aircraft used for comparison throughout this paper, i.e., the piloted ASTORs in the airborne 
concept simulation, none were involved in any losses of separation in the ground-based experiment. However, other 
elements of the scenarios included extremely complex traffic flow interactions, often involving climbing and 
descending aircraft and provoking hard-to-resolve short-term conflicts.   These situations stressed the function 
allocation concept and sometimes resulted in LOS events in some sectors involving aircraft not considered for data 
comparison in this paper. The results are included in other publications23 that discuss additional findings related to 
the other aspects of the ground-based study.  
                                                          
* The criteria for loss of separation were a closest point of approach within 5 nmi and 800 ft. 
† ATC sectors were not modeled in the airborne experiment as they were not relevant to the concept. 
Table 8. Resolutions for conflicts in the four A T C sectors in the airborne exper iment.   
 
Tactical Over ride Resolutions 
 Density Schedule ZID 80 ZID 81 ZKC 90 ZKC 98 Total Mean 
M1 1.5x No 3 3 8 0 14 1.85 
M2 2.0x No 5 2 3 1 11 1.42 
M4 1.5x Yes 2 2 0 1 5 0.62 
M3 2.0x Yes 2 3 7 5 17 2.20 
Overall 12 10 18 7 47  
Tactical (Non-Over ride) Resolutions 
 Density Schedule ZID 80 ZID 81 ZKC 90 ZKC 98 Total Mean 
M1 1.5x No 0 3 0 1 4 0.55 
M2 2.0x No 2 2 1 0 5 0.62 
M4 1.5x Yes 2 2 1 0 5 .050 
M3 2.0x Yes 1 4 2 3 10 1.25 
Overall 5 11 4 4 23  
Strategic Resolutions 
 Density Schedule ZID 80 ZID 81 ZKC 90 ZKC 98 Total Mean 
M1 1.5x No 8 4 24 7 43 5.60 
M2 2.0x No 3 5 13 3 24 3.10 
M4 1.5x Yes 5 1 25 1 32 4.18 
M3 2.0x Yes 8 5 15 1 29 3.82 
Overall 24 15 77 12 128  
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The primary reason for a LOS in the ground-based approach is usually very late conflict detection related to 
complex interactions of various factors. For example, in the M scenarios at 2.0x traffic density, dense departure 
streams from the St. Louis airport (centrally located in the rectangular experiment airspace) climbed into dense 
arrival and overflight traffic in the northern part of ZKC90 and the southern part of ZKC98. The aircraft were on 
steep climb trajectories and were handed off from a confederate controller’s airspace into the test airspace.   Since 
aircraft control systems do not try to maintain a predefined vertical flight profile on climb trajectories, the prediction 
accuracy for climb trajectories is generally much worse than for en route or arrival aircraft. Therefore, conflicts were 
often detected very late, with less than four minutes to the predicted LOS.  This short horizon was too close for the 
trajectory-based automation to issue a trajectory amendment automatically. The controllers frequently wanted to 
stop the climbing aircraft until clear of the conflicting traffic and then resume the climb. To accomplish this, they 
sometimes uplinked a new trajectory with a new altitude, and other times they issued voice commands. Due to the 
situation’s  urgency,  the  controllers  usually  did  not  use the automation tools to trial-plan and conflict-probe the 
altitude assignment issued by voice.  They were also sometimes unable to easily find an altitude that cleared the 7 
nmi buffer used in the trial-plan conflict detection tool. While this was happening, TSAFE would at times also issue 
a heading to one or both of the aircraft, requiring the controller to then deal with the off-track situation and re-
evaluate the altitude he or she had issued, which may not have originally been conflict-free. Dealing with such 
situations increases controller workload significantly, and  draws  the  controller’s  attention  to  a  specific  problem. 
Even more challenging was the issue that, due to the density of the departure flow, two or three of these conflicts 
were sometimes flagged simultaneously to the controller, with little time to solve the problems. In this study, the 
controllers were not able to stop the automation from issuing a TSAFE heading, and an even more complex situation 
could arise, sometimes leading to a LOS. 
In the future, various changes will be investigated to address these kinds of problems.  For example, in addition 
to heading changes, TSAFE will be allowed to send altitude changes to the aircraft.  Trial-plan altitudes will be pre-
probed so that controllers will not have to find a clear altitude by trial and error.  Controllers will have a means to 
stop TSAFE from sending any changes.  Traffic flow managers will be available to precondition the departure flows 
from the confederate controllers’ airspace, if necessary, to manage the complexity inside the sectors. 
 
Airborne Experiment LOS 
In the airborne experiment, six losses of separation involving subject-piloted aircraft occurred in the ATC sector 
airspace of the ground-based experiment, and four occurred elsewhere.  Of  the  six,  two were  “proximity  events” 
with closest points of  approach  greater  than  4.5  nmi,  and  four  were  “operational  errors”  with  closest  points of 
approach less than 4.5 nmi.  Of the remaining four, three were operational errors. Two LOS events (one inside and 
one outside the ATC sectors) occurred to the same subject-piloted aircraft within a brief span of time.  Every LOS 
event was between a subject-piloted aircraft and a TMX aircraft.  Short conflict detection time was a factor in all 1- 
LOS events and was caused by a variety of factors, including simulation faults and pilot error, as described below. 
An analysis of each of the 10 LOS events was performed to determine the primary and contributing factors 
leading to the event.  Figure 15 shows the primary factors.  Five were attributed to automation or simulation faults, 
four to a combination of automation/simulation faults and pilot error, and one to pilot error alone.  In most of the 
cases attributed to automation, where the automation failed to provide the pilot with adequate guidance to prevent 
the LOS, the root cause was determined to be the TMX software faults discussed earlier in the time-to-LOS analysis 
and in more detail here.   
In six of the nine events attributed partially or fully to 
automation (blue and red in Fig. 15), incorrect filtering out of 
conflicts by TMX caused the TMX aircraft to never see the ASTOR 
aircraft prior to the LOS. The filtering was included to reduce 
computational load in TMX to enable the large aircraft count 
required by the scenarios.  As a result of the incorrect filtering, 
TMX aircraft could not take its own independent action to resolve 
the conflicts as intended in the concept. Four of the five LOS events 
attributed solely to automation (blue in Fig. 15) were the result of an 
additional software error in TMX in which wrong target altitudes 
were broadcast.  This error caused the AOP to predict that no 
conflict existed, a false prediction that persisted until the actual 
position of the TMX aircraft was close enough that the incorrect 
projected path was inside the LOS criteria and the conflict was 
detected.  As a result, the pilots were alerted with only zero to 20 
 
F igure 15.  Primary factors leading to 
the subject-pilot L OS events in the 
airborne exper iment.  All 10 events 
from the experiment are shown.  Six of 
the events occurred within the airspace of 
the four ATC sectors. 
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seconds notice, and because no conflict-free tactical solutions were available, not enough time or guidance was 
provided to prevent the actual losses of separation.  The fifth LOS event attributed to automation was a result of the 
TMX aircraft sending out incorrect TCPs; the pilot was alerted with 20 seconds warning, and no tactical override 
solution was available. 
The four LOS events attributed to both automation and pilot error (red in Fig. 15) occurred in part because the 
automation was given faulty information, as described above, but also because the pilot took some procedurally 
incorrect action to help cause the LOS.  Two of the four cases were related to inaccuracy of the AOP’s  climb 
prediction for the traffic aircraft; the TMX aircraft’s true climb rate was much less than the prediction, resulting in 
first detections of 19 and 20 seconds time-to-LOS.  The automation did provide tactical override guidance, but the 
pilots delayed their execution actions, resulting in the two LOS events.  In the other two LOS events, the pilots 
placed the auto-flight system in modes unsupported by the AOP, despite training and annunciation of the 
unsupported mode, resulting in first detections of 19 and 120 seconds time-to-LOS and eventual LOS. 
The single LOS event attributed to pilot error alone was due to the pilot becoming task saturated and losing 
situation awareness.  Against procedures, he descended into the LOS.  All 10 LOS events are undergoing further 
review to determine the appropriate changes to automation capabilities, pilot procedures, and training to prevent 
recurrences. 
Several design and procedural changes will be made based on the analysis of these LOS events.  Simulation 
faults will be corrected to ensure that all aircraft are correctly receiving surveillance information and broadcasting 
the correct trajectory information, which should significantly reduce the number of late conflict alerts to the pilot.  
AOP support for flight modes will be increased to reduce or eliminate the number of unsupported conditions, and 
pilot procedures for handling unsupported modes will be improved.  Tactical guidance for short term conflicts will 
be improved to eliminate any automation delays in providing resolutions and to ensure a solution is always 
available.  Vertical guidance cues will be redesigned to be more obvious and easier for the pilot to follow.  Finally, 
procedures will change to make sure the pilot will not be distracted by the FMS when tactical conflict resolution 
maneuvers are required. 
B . Efficiency  
Efficiency results are presented in the areas of flight path deviation from the initial trajectory and schedule 
conformance.  These metrics are comparable between the two experiments, although procedural differences between 
the pilots in one experiment and the controllers in the other have an impact on the results.  Statistical analysis of 
each experiment’s respective dataset was performed using an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). Rank transformation 
was applied to the data when necessary to reduce the influence of outliers and stabilize variance across scenarios. 
Analyses for the ground-based experiment treated each individual aircraft as an independent data point, whereas for 
the airborne experiment, data were averaged over the 12 pilots within each group (recall that four groups of 12 pilots 
participated in the airborne experiment). 
 
1. F light Path Deviation (overall) 
The M scenarios facilitated an investigation of two independent variables: traffic density (1.5x and 2.0x), and the 
presence of scheduling (RTA/STA assignment, no RTA/STA assignment).  The S scenarios facilitated an 
investigation of the timing of trajectory changes due to scheduling constraints: a single unchanged RTA/STA 
assignment, a second revised RTA/STA assignment for all scheduled aircraft occurring at dispersed times, and a 
second revised RTA/STA assignment for all scheduled aircraft occurring at a synchronized time.  For each 
experiment run, the lateral flight path deviation from the 
initial nominal trajectory, i.e. excess horizontal path, was 
computed for each subject-piloted aircraft. Table 9 presents 
descriptive statistics associated with these data for the entire 
sets of M and S scenarios. A negative value indicates that 
the trajectory actually flown during the run was shorter than 
the original trajectory for that aircraft.  In the airborne 
experiment data, the large maximum deviation associated 
with the M scenarios (168.7 nmi) was the result of two 
aircraft that turned 360 degrees due to their circumstances.  
Excluding these two data points, the maximum flight path 
deviation was 37.0 nmi. 
 
Table 9. Descr iptive statistics for lateral flight 
path deviation (nmi) for the M and S scenarios. 
 
G round-Based Experiment 
Matrix N Mean SD Min Med Max 
M 192 3.8 8.3 -2.4 0 44.7 
S 432 4.9 10.1 -3.2 0 75.5 
Airborne Experiment 
Matrix N Mean SD Min Med Max 
M 366 2.3 11.1 -7.9 0 168.7 
S 270 2.1 4.2 -0.1 0 23.8 
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E ffect of Traffic Density and Schedule Assignment (M Scenarios) 
Descriptive statistics associated with the four M scenarios are shown in Table 10.*  
In the ground-based experiment data, a significant main effect was observed in the traffic density manipulation 
(p = 0.004), resulting in larger lateral flight path deviations in the 2.0x traffic density (see upper two histograms in 
Fig. 16).  No statistically significant difference was found in the scheduling manipulation (p = 0.791), and the 
interaction effect was also not significant (p = 0.617). 
In the airborne experiment, similar to the ground-based experiment results, there was no statistically significant 
difference in the mean lateral flight path deviation in the scheduling manipulation (p = 0.647). However, the traffic 
density effect was found to be significant (p < 0.001), indicating that increasing the traffic density from 1.5x to 2.0x 
increased the mean lateral flight path deviation, which can also be seen in the distributions of the two lower 
histograms in Fig. 16. The interaction effect between scheduling assignment and traffic density was also not found 
to be statistically significant (p = 0.576). 
                                                          
* In the airborne experiment, two data points were excluded from the flight path deviation analysis.  In M1, an 
aircraft prematurely exited the experiment airspace, and in M3, an ASTOR software crash prematurely terminated 
another aircraft’s flight. 
Table 10. Descr iptive statistics for lateral flight path deviation (nmi) in each M scenario. 
 
G round-Based Experiment 
 Traffic 
Density 
Schedule 
Assignment N Mean SD Min Med Max 
M1 1.5x No 48 2.2 7.8 -1.2 0 38.9 
M2 2.0x No 48 5.0 8.3 0 2.7 40.2 
M4 1.5x Yes 48 1.9 7.1 -2.4 0 44.7 
M3 2.0x Yes 48 5.9 9.5 0 0.4 35.6 
Airborne Experiment 
 Traffic 
Density 
Schedule 
Assignment N Mean SD Min Med Max 
M1 1.5x No 91 0.8 3.7 -6.9 -0.1 13.3 
M2 2.0x No 92 3.3 12.1 -0.9 0 104.1 
M4 1.5x Yes 92 0.8 3.0 -7.9 -0.1 12.5 
M3 2.0x Yes 91 4.3 17.8 -1.1 0.4 168.7 
 
 
 
F igure 16. H istograms of lateral flight path deviation for traffic densities of 1.5x and 2.0x. 
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E ffect of Timing of the Trajectory Change Event (S scenarios) 
Descriptive statistics associated with the three S scenarios are shown in Table 11.  
For the ground-based experiment, no statistically significant differences were observed between the three 
scheduling conditions.  This is likely due to the fact that, as discussed further in the schedule conformance analysis, 
the controllers did not have enough time during the 15-minute scenarios to always implement the trajectory change 
needed to absorb the delay from the second STA assignment.  The ground-based experiment’s distribution of  the 
mean lateral path deviation for the different rescheduling conditions is shown in comparison to the airborne 
experiment’s  distributions  in  Fig. 17.  The distribution of the mean lateral path deviation from the ground-based 
experiment indicates that the three scenarios were worked by the controllers in a similar fashion. 
For the airborne experiment, in contrast to the data from the ground-based experiment, the trajectory change 
event was found to have a statistically significant effect on the mean lateral flight path deviation (p = 0.005).  The 
result was expected, because the event was 
designed to require a path stretch to absorb an 
arrival delay. Tukey simultaneous pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the mean lateral flight 
path deviation was significantly lower for scenario 
S1 compared to scenarios S2 (p = 0.038) and S3 (p 
= 0.005). However, there was no statistically 
significant difference between scenarios S2 and S3 
(p = 0.589). Therefore, the inclusion of a second 
RTA, triggering another trajectory change intended 
to absorb the new delay, increased the lateral flight 
path deviation as expected, but the timing of this 
event did not have a significant effect.   
 
  
Table 11. Descr iptive statistics for lateral flight path 
deviation (nmi) in each S scenario. 
 
G round-Based Experiment 
 Rescheduling N Mean SD Min Med Max 
S1 None 144 3.5 7.5 0 0 40.0 
S2 Dispersed 144 5.3 10.5 -3.2 0 40.8 
S3 Synchronous 144 5.9 11.8 -3.2 0 75.5 
Airborne Experiment 
 Rescheduling N Mean SD Min Med Max 
S1 None 92 0.7 2.0 -0.1 0 11.8 
S2 Dispersed 89 2.7 4.9 -0.1 0 23.8 
S3 Synchronous 89 3.1 4.6 -0.1 0.7 19.6 
 
 
F igure 17. H istograms of lateral flight path deviation in each condition of the S matrix. 
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2. Schedule Conformance (overall) 
 For each experiment run, the difference between an aircraft’s last reported ETA at the metering fix and its last 
issued STA (ground-based terminology) or RTA (airborne terminology) at that fix was computed to represent an 
aircraft’s end-of-run schedule conformance. Ideally an aircraft’s value for this metric would be as close as possible 
to zero, indicative of a predicted on-time arrival at the metering fix: neither early (negative numbers) nor late 
(positive numbers). Overall descriptive statistics for these data are given in Table 12 for the M and S scenarios 
where there were schedule assignments.  The median schedule conformance indicated high schedule conformance 
for both experiments in both M and S scenarios.  In the S scenarios of the ground-based experiment, the observed 
large negative minimum value (and therefore the large standard deviation) was indicative of some aircraft not yet 
having been issued a delay maneuver by the controller prior to the termination of the short-duration scenario.  In 
most or all of these cases, it was likely that the trajectory amendments would have been issued at a later time, as 
controllers often prioritize these actions by the aircraft scheduled to arrive the earliest.  In the airborne experiment, 
the large negative minimum value also indicated that the 
delay maneuvers were not always executed before the 
run expired.  Both indications were confirmed by visual 
review of selected controller and pilot playback files.  
Also of note, data for the ground-side analysis used 
fewer data points than shown in the Tables 10 and 11 of 
the flight path deviation analysis.  This difference is 
because not all flows into the seven local airports were 
managed by one of the four controller positions.  Two of 
the seven local airports with the lightest flows were not 
metered, and thus aircraft flying to those destinations did 
not receive STA messages. 
 
E ffect of Traffic Density (M Scenarios) 
Descriptive statistics associated with the M 
scenarios, in which traffic density was varied, are 
shown in Table 13.* Similar median schedule 
conformance, 3 seconds or less, is evident across traffic 
densities (1.5x and 2.0x) and across concepts (ground-
based and airborne).   
In the airborne experiment, the large mean and 
standard deviation at the 2.0x traffic density level were 
the result of the large maximum value (1170 sec) , a 
single outlier in which an aircraft turned 360 degrees 
due to conflict circumstances and therefore fell 
significantly behind schedule.  Excluding this data 
point, the maximum value was 94 seconds.  From the 
histograms in Fig. 18, the higher peaks in the zero 
second bin (less than 5 seconds early or late) for the 
airborne experiment data are consistent with the airborne use of the FMS RTA functionality in which the auto-
throttle actively controls speed to zero out RTA deviation.  In the ground-based experiment, speeds were assigned to 
aircraft by the controller using the ground automation to ensure better matching of ground-based automation 
predictions to aircraft performance. Airborne RTA functionality was not used and the ground automation is designed 
to deliver aircraft within 15 seconds of their STA, which is considered sufficient for flow management purposes in 
the ground-based concept.   
                                                          
* In the airborne experiment, a data point was excluded from the flight path deviation analysis.  In M3, an ASTOR 
software crash prematurely terminated the aircraft’s flight. 
Table 12. Descr iptive statistics for M and S 
scenario schedule conformance (sec). 
 
G round-Based Experiment 
Matrix N Mean SD Min Med Max 
M 88 5.0 10.8 -8 3 59 
S 360 -73.1 133.6 -408 0 170 
Airborne Experiment 
Matrix N Mean SD Min Med Max 
M 183 8.3 87.6 -87 2 1170 
S 270 -14.8 49.6 -322 -1 7 
 
Table 13. Descr iptive statistics for schedule 
conformance (sec) for the M scenarios. 
 
G round-Based Experiment 
Traffic 
Density N Mean SD Min Med Max 
1.5x 48 4.2 10.0 -8 3 59 
2.0x 40 6.0 11.8 -8 2.5 51 
Airborne Experiment 
Traffic 
Density N Mean SD Min Med Max 
1.5x 92 0.5 7.9 -65 2 11 
2.0x 91 16.2 123.9 -87 2 1170 
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Overall, across both traffic density conditions, the 95th percentile in the ground-based experiment was 21 
seconds, i.e., 84 of 88 aircraft had a schedule deviation of 21 seconds or less, and the 99th percentile was 51, i.e., 87 
of 88 aircraft.  In the airborne experiment, the 95th percentile was 9 seconds, i.e., 173 of 183 aircraft had a schedule 
deviation of 9 seconds or less, and the 99th percentile was 74 seconds, i.e., 181 of 183 aircraft.   For both concepts, 
other than select outliers, the schedule conformance was quite good. 
Analysis of the ground-based experiment data failed to obtain a significant effect of the traffic density 
manipulation (p = 0.426). In the airborne experiment data, traffic density was not found to have a statistically 
significant effect on predicted arrival delay (p = 0.301).  
 
E ffect of Timing of the Trajectory Change Event (S Scenarios) 
Effects of the inclusion and timing of an arrival 
schedule revision necessitating delay maneuvers 
were investigated through the comparison of aircraft 
schedule conformance between scenarios S1 (initial 
STA/RTA only), S2 (revised STA/RTA at dispersed 
times), and S3 (revised STA/RTA at synchronous 
times). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 
14, and histograms are presented in Fig. 19.  In the 
data of both experiments, a comparison of mean 
schedule conformance indicates clear differences 
between the non-rescheduled condition (none) and 
the rescheduled conditions (dispersed and 
synchronous).  The airborne data had lower means 
and standard deviations as a result of less extreme 
outliers.   
 
 
F igure 18. Predicted schedule conformance for the 1.5x and 2.0x M scenarios. 
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Table 14. Descr iptive statistics for schedule 
conformance (sec) for the S scenarios. 
 
G round-Based Experiment 
Rescheduling N Mean SD Min Med Max 
None 120 -5.5 44.7 -152 0 170 
Dispersed 120 -117.7 151.9 -407 -1 70 
Synchronous 120 -96.1 147.0 -407 -1 167 
Airborne Experiment 
Rescheduling N Mean SD Min Med Max 
None 92 -0.7 8.4 -63 1 6 
Dispersed 89 -21.4 59.3 -286 -3 7 
Synchronous 89 -22.7 60.2 -322 -3 3 
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In the ground-based experiment’s  data analysis, a significant main effect of the schedule revision event on 
schedule compliance was also obtained (p < 0.001). Tukey simultaneous pairwise comparisons likewise showed 
greater schedule compliance in scenario S1 (no revision) compared to scenarios S2 (p < 0.001) and S3 (p < 0.005) 
with no difference found between S2 and S3 (p = 0.625).  The fact that S1 was found to differ significantly from S2 
and S3 is most apparently explainable by differences in the number of aircraft that were predicted to be more than 
two minutes early: five aircraft in S1, 48 aircraft in S2, and 41 aircraft in S3, respectively. An initial review of 
controller screen recordings indicate that this outcome was caused by controllers running out of time before the end 
of the S scenario. In other words, they did not have enough time to implement a second trajectory change needed to 
absorb the additional 4-5 minutes of delay in scenarios S2 and S3. Only two of these aircraft, however, were closer 
than 25 minutes to their meter fix crossing point. Since controllers generally prioritized closer-in aircraft over those 
further out, they would have likely addressed these scheduling needs in time. 
In  the  airborne  experiment’s  data  analysis,  the  trajectory  change  event  was  found  to  have  a  statistically 
significant effect on the mean predicted arrival time deviation (p < 0.001). Tukey simultaneous pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the mean predicted arrival delay was significantly lower for scenario S1 compared to 
scenarios S2 (p < 0.001) and S3 (p < 0.001). However, no statistically significant difference was indicated between 
scenarios S2 and S3 (p = 0.968). Therefore, the inclusion of a second RTA (indicating that a delay maneuver was 
required) had a significant effect on the mean predicted arrival delay, but the timing of this event did not. 
C . Subjective Assessments 
Results presented here reflecting subjective assessments of the participant controllers and pilots include 
workload and general concept acceptability.  The subjective assessment results between the two experiments are not 
fully comparable, as they represent two different points of view of the concepts and are measured by instruments of 
different scales (to be described below).  However, the results from the two concepts are presented together for 
limited comparison to provide a high-level context for assessing in general terms the human role in working with 
automation to accomplish a set of tasks resulting in safe passage of aircraft through the airspace.  It should be noted 
that neither experiment collected subjective assessment data on the opposite role (pilots in the ground-based 
experiment and controllers in the airborne experiment), and that the controller and pilot participants were not briefed 
on the alternative concept of operations. 
   
 
   
F igure 19. Predicted schedule conformance for the S scenarios.  Negative values represent early 
arrival predictions. 
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1. Workload Ratings (overall) 
 In the ground-based concept experiment, controllers provided a workload assessment after every run by 
completing portions of the NASA Task Load Index (TLX).24  The original TLX has six scales that query participants 
about different aspects of their workload such as the mental demand of the task, their effort, and frustration.  For all 
runs, the controllers completed the mental demand and time pressure scales. They rated these aspects of their 
workload on a seven-point scale, from “very low” to “very high.”  The second portion of the TLX that can be used 
to normalize participants’ answers was not completed for this study.   
 In the airborne concept experiment, pilots provided a workload assessment after each scenario using the 
Modified Cooper-Harper (MCH) Subjective Workload Rating Scale.25  Use of the MCH scale yields an overall 
workload rating ranging from “1” (indicating that the instructed task was very easy/highly desirable; operator mental 
effort was minimal; and desired performance was easily attainable) to “10” (indicating that the instructed task was 
impossible and could not be accomplished reliably).  A rating of “3” indicates that the instructed task had a fair or 
mild difficulty level and that an acceptable level of operator mental effort was required to attain adequate system 
performance; therefore, an a priori decision was made that ratings of “3” or less would serve as an indication of an 
acceptable level of pilot workload.   
Descriptive  statistics  from the controllers’ TLX workload ratings  in  the 
ground-based experiment are shown in Table 15.*  The  controllers’  mean 
workload ratings associated with the seven-point TLX scales indicate that 
they found the tasks performed during the ground-based  concept’s  M 
scenarios  to  have  a  “below  average”  level  of mental  demand  and  a  “low” 
degree of time pressure and found the tasks performed during the S 
scenarios  to  have  a  “medium” or  “average”  level  of mental  demand and  a 
“below  average”  degree  of  time  pressure.  Descriptive statistics from the 
pilots’ MCH workload ratings in the airborne experiment are shown in Table 
16.†  Similar to the ground-based experiment results, the pilots’  mean 
workload ratings associated with the 10-point MCH scale indicate that they 
found the tasks performed during the airborne concept’s M and S scenarios 
to have a difficulty level of “fair” or “mild” and that they felt an acceptable 
level of mental effort was required to attain adequate performance.    
Distributions of  the controllers’ TLX mental demand and  time pressure 
workload ratings associated with the M and S scenarios are shown in Figs. 
20 and 21.  For the ground-based concept’s M scenarios, 38 percent of the 
controllers’ TLX mental demand scale ratings had values of “1” or “2,” and 
67 percent of the time pressure scale ratings had values of “1” or “2.”  For 
the S scenarios, 41 percent  of  the  controllers’  mental  demand  ratings  had 
values of “1” or “2,” and 54 percent of the time pressure ratings had values 
of  “1”  or  “2.”    Overall,  these  descriptive  parameters  indicate  that  the 
workload experienced by the controllers was within acceptable limits.  The 
six mental demand ratings of “6” or higher recorded after  the M scenarios  indicate high  load but were associated 
with runs that simulated 2.0x today’s traffic, and individual differences are very evident.  No time pressure ratings 
were given at this high end of the scale for the M scenarios. 
During the ground-based  concept’s  S  scenarios,  there  were  times  that  the  controllers  had  many  events  co-
occurring.  The 18 mental demand ratings of “7,” indicating very high load, were chosen through all three of the S 
scenarios (S1, S2, and S3) but always by controllers working the ZKC sectors.  Similarly, the nine time pressure 
ratings of “6 ” or above, indicating high pressure, were chosen through all of the S scenarios but, again, always by 
controllers working ZKC airspace.  Although the traffic levels and complexity in the ZKC sectors indicate that it is 
likely that scenario load is the reason for the higher ratings, there is a confound in the data.  Only active controller 
                                                          
* Sample sizes of 64 and 128, respectively, were anticipated since each of the eight controllers was asked to provide 
workload ratings after completing each scenario (eight M scenarios and 16 S scenarios).  Due to simulation mishaps, 
some runs were repeated giving additional data. 
 
† Sample sizes of 368 and 276, respectively, were anticipated since each of the 46 pilots was asked to provide a 
MCH workload rating after completing each scenario (eight M scenarios and six S scenarios).  Four pilots did not 
complete the MCH scale as requested, however, resulting in an absence of data. 
Table 16. Descr iptive statistics 
for pilots’  MCH  workload 
ratings in the airborne 
exper iment. 
 
Matrix N Mean SD 
M 340 2.41 1.80 
S 253 2.14 1.33 
 
Table 15. Descr iptive statistics 
for controllers’  TLX  workload 
ratings in the ground-based 
exper iment. 
 
Mental Demand 
Matrix N Mean SD 
M 72 3.04 1.41 
S 144 3.69 2.05 
T ime Pressure 
Matrix N Mean SD 
M 72 2.09 1.13 
S 144 2.75 1.72 
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participants worked these sectors, making it a possibility that there was a difference in the way active and retired 
controllers rated their experiences. 
Distributions of the pilots’ MCH ratings associated with the M and S scenarios are shown in Figs. 22 and 23.  In 
the airborne experiment, 85 percent of the pilots’ MCH workload ratings provided in conjunction with the airborne 
concept’s M scenarios consisted of ratings of “3” or less, and 90 percent of the ratings for the airborne concept’s S 
scenarios consisted of  ratings of “3” or  less.   Overall,  these results  indicate  that  the workload experienced by the 
pilot participants was deemed to be acceptable.  However, specific events will be analyzed and described in 
subsequent papers to elucidate why, at times, pilots provided ratings associated with unacceptable levels of 
workload.  For example, the 15 ratings of “7” or higher recorded in conjunction with the M scenarios, 11 of which 
were  associated  with  runs  simulating  2.0x  traffic  density,    and  the  four  ratings  of  “7”  and  “8”  recorded  in 
conjunction with the S scenarios, three of which were associated with runs simulating synchronous trajectory change 
events, will be closely examined. 
 
E ffect of Traffic Density and Schedule Assignment (M Scenarios) 
Descriptive statistics for the TLX workload ratings associated with the ground-based concept’s M scenarios are 
shown in Table 17, and descriptive statistics for the MCH workload ratings associated with the airborne concept’s M 
scenarios are shown in Table 18.    Statistical  analysis  of  each  experiment’s  respective  set  of  data was  performed 
using nonparametric within-subject tests appropriate for analyzing related samples of ordinal data (i.e., Friedman 
and/or Wilcoxon tests).   Details regarding the airborne concept experiment’s workload data analysis are presented 
 
F igure 22. Distribution  of  pilots’  MCH 
workload ratings for the M scenarios. 
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F igure 23. Distribution  of  pilots’  MCH 
workload ratings for the S scenarios. 
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F igure 20. Distr ibution of controllers’ TLX 
workload ratings for the M scenarios. 
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F igure 21. Distr ibution of controllers’ TLX 
workload ratings for the S scenarios. 
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elsewhere,26 and details regarding the ground-based concept 
experiment’s  data  analysis  will  be  available  in  subsequent 
publications.  Results  associated  with  each  experiment’s 
workload rating data are briefly described below. 
For the ground-based experiment, no statistically 
significant difference was found to exist between the mental 
demand ratings controllers provided for scenarios involving 
scheduling assignments (M3 and M4)  as compared to 
scenarios involving no scheduling assignment (baseline 
scenarios M1 and M2)  (p = 0.327).  Similarly, no statistically 
significant difference was found to exist between the time 
pressure ratings controllers provided for scenarios involving 
scheduling assignments (M3 and M4)  versus the baseline 
scenarios (M1 and M2)  (p = 0.44).  While metering did not 
have a significant effect on controllers’ ratings of their mental 
and time load, their average ratings under conditions 
involving scheduling assignments were generally higher.  
This supports the use of scheduling tools under these 
conditions because metering adds constraints to the controller 
tasks, making them more difficult.  Having no significant 
difference between the baseline and metering conditions 
suggests the tools offset a portion of the additional load 
created by the metering task. 
A statistically significant difference existed between 
controllers’ mental demand ratings of scenarios involving the 
1.5x traffic density level (M1 and M4)  and scenarios 
involving the 2.0x traffic density level (M2 and M3)  (p = 
0.012).  Furthermore, a statistically significant difference 
existed between controllers’  time  pressure  ratings  of 
scenarios involving the 1.5x traffic density level (M1 and 
M4)  and scenarios involving the 2.0x traffic density level 
(M2 and M3)  (p = 0.012).  Thus, greater amounts of traffic and the increase in problem complexity associated with 
this did have an impact on the controllers as reflected in the level of mental and time load they felt completing the 
problems. 
For the airborne experiment, a statistically  significant  difference  existed  between  pilots’ workload  ratings  for 
scenario M1 as compared to M3 (p = 0.034).  Pilots found that the combination of higher traffic density and an RTA 
constraint increased workload, whereas either effect separately did not.  (Note that pilots were not told the traffic 
density of each scenario or that the density was changing between scenarios.)  No statistically significant difference 
was  found  to exist between pilots’ workload  ratings of  scenarios  involving  the 1.5x  traffic density  level  (M1 and 
M4)  and scenarios involving the 2.0x traffic density level (M2 and M3)  (p = 0.267).  Pilots provided a statistically 
significant lower mean workload rating for scenarios flown without RTAs (M1 and M2) when compared with 
scenarios flown with RTAs (M3 and M4) (p = 0.031).  This RTA effect may be related to the extra effort required to 
comprehend the RTA data link message, load the RTA in the FMS, and execute the change. 
 
E ffect of Timing of the Trajectory Change Event (S Scenarios) 
Descriptive statistics for the TLX workload ratings associated with the ground-based concept’s three S scenarios 
are shown in Table 19, and descriptive statistics for the MCH workload ratings associated with the airborne 
concept’s  three  S  scenarios  are  shown  in  Table  20.  As with the M scenarios, statistical analysis of each 
experiment’s respective data set was performed using nonparametric within-subject tests appropriate for analyzing 
related samples of ordinal data.  A brief description of results is provided below. 
For both mental demand and time pressure, controllers reported experiencing lower average workload levels 
during the basic STA condition (S1) than during either the dispersed or synchronous metering conditions (S2 or S3).  
The  controllers  provided  fewer  of  the  “very  high”  mental  demand  ratings  for  S1  than  for  S2  or S3, but no 
statistically significant difference existed among the mental demand ratings across the three conditions.  
Additionally,  there  was  no  significant  difference  between  the  controllers’  ratings  of  the  time  pressure  they  felt 
during each condition, although, again, they used fewer of the “very high” time pressure ratings in S1 than in S2 or 
Table 17. Descr iptive statistics for controllers’ 
T L X workload ratings in the ground-based 
experiment’s M scenarios. 
 
Mental Demand 
 Traffic 
Density 
Schedule 
Assignment N Mean SD 
M1 1.5x No 16 2.12 0.81 
M2 2.0x No 24 3.50 1.50 
M4 1.5x Yes 16 2.68 1.01 
M3 2.0x Yes 16 3.62 1.65 
T ime Pressure 
 
Traffic 
Density 
Schedule 
Assignment N Mean SD 
M1 1.5x No 16 1.43 0.73 
M2 2.0x No 24 2.57 1.22 
M4 1.5x Yes 16 1.68 0.79 
M3 2.0x Yes 16 2.81 1.19 
 
Table 18. Descr iptive statistics for pilots’ 
M C H workload ratings in the airborne 
experiment’s M scenarios. 
 
 Traffic 
Density 
Schedule 
Assignment N Mean SD 
M1 1.5x No 85 2.18 1.83 
M2 2.0x No 85 2.33 1.65 
M4 1.5x Yes 85 2.41 1.41 
M3 2.0x Yes 85 2.73 2.18 
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S3 and reported a lower average mental workload in conjunction 
with S1.  Thus, in terms of perceived mental and time load, although 
it made a difference to the distribution  of  controllers’  ratings,  the 
style of metering did not significantly affect their perceptions of 
workload. 
Pilots provided a statistically significant lower mean workload 
rating for the baseline scenario (S1) than for either scenario 
involving RTA changes [i.e., scenario S2, which involved an RTA 
change sent to one aircraft every 10 seconds, (p = 0.002); or scenario 
S3, which involved sending RTA changes to all aircraft at the same 
time, (p = 0.009)].  However, no statistically significant difference 
was indicated between the ratings provided for scenarios S2 and S3 
(p = 0.982).  Therefore, the inclusion of a second RTA event affected 
pilot workload, but the relative timing of this event among the 75 
aircraft did not affect pilot workload.   
 
2. Ratings of the Operational Concepts and Procedures 
In the ground-based concept experiment, controller participants 
completed a modified version of the Controller Acceptance Rating 
Scale (CARS)27 after every run.  The scale was broken down into six 
questions, three of which had a yes/no answer format and three that 
were answered using three-point rating scales.  These latter rating 
responses and the first yes/no question were combined to create the 
10-point  rating  scale  of  the  CARS,  with  “1”  indicating  that  the 
operation  was  unsafe  and  unworkable  and  “10”  indicating  that  the 
operation was completely acceptable. 
Pilots provided feedback regarding the acceptability of the airborne self-separation operational concept by 
completing post-scenario and post-experiment questionnaires and participating in post-experiment group debriefing 
sessions.  Questionnaire items were answered using a yes/no format, seven-point rating scales, or text entry fields.  
As reported in Wing et al.26, group-debrief sessions involved discussion of several common themes regarding the 
operational concept in general and its implementation within the experiment environment. 
 
Controller and Pilot Post-Run Assessments of the M scenarios 
The  controllers’  modal  acceptability  (CARS)  rating  for  the  M  scenarios  was  “8,”  indicating  that  “minimal 
controller compensation [was] needed to reach desired performance.”  Fifty-four percent of the controllers gave the 
operation this rating, indicating that the operation was satisfactory and had adequate performance.  When tested 
against the four M scenarios (M1 – M4), these CARS ratings were not significantly different at the p ≤ 0.05 level.  
Table 21 splits out the three selections made by controllers to create the CARS: safety, adequacy, and 
“satisfactoriness.”    For  example,  column two of the table shows that 78 percent of responses indicated that the 
operation was safe.  Note, however, that these confirmations were more common in the lower (1.5x) traffic density 
conditions (M1 and M4), where 91 percent of responses were confirmations, than in the higher (2.0x) traffic density 
conditions (M2 and M3), where only 67.5 percent of responses were confirmations.  This finding suggests that 
controllers judged the operation performed during the 2.0x traffic density level to be safe only two-thirds of the 
Table 19. Descr iptive statistics for 
controllers’ TLX workload  ratings  in 
the ground-based  experiment’s  S 
scenarios. 
 
Mental Demand 
 Rescheduling N Mean SD 
S1 None 48 3.54 1.82 
S2 Dispersed 48 3.72 2.18 
S3 Synchronous 48 3.81 2.18 
T ime Pressure 
 Rescheduling N Mean SD 
S1 None 48 2.47 1.59 
S2 Dispersed 48 2.83 1.75 
S3 Synchronous 48 2.95 1.82 
 
Table 20. Descr iptive statistics for 
pilots’ MCH workload  ratings  in  the 
airborne experiment’s S scenarios. 
 
 Rescheduling N Mean SD 
S1 None 84 1.83 1.16 
S2 Dispersed 85 2.30 1.27 
S3 Synchronous 84 2.27 1.50 
 
Table 21.  Confirmation counts for the ground-based concept over the four M scenarios’ CARS ratings. 
 
 Traffic 
Density 
Schedule 
Assignment 
Operation 
Rated 
“Safe” 
Operation 
Rated 
“Adequate” 
Operation 
Rated 
“Satisfactory” 
Total Ratings Above 
“Acceptable” 
M1 1.5x No 15 (of 16) 14 (of 15) 14 (of 14) 14 
M2 2.0x No 17 (of 24) 17 (of 17) 16 (of 17) 16 
M4 1.5x Yes 14 (of 16) 14 (of 14) 14 (of 14) 14 
M3 2.0x Yes 10 (of 16) 10 (of 10) 9 (of 10) 9 
   Total = 56 
(of 72), or 78% 
Total = 55 
(of 56), or 98% 
Total = 53 
(of 55), or 96% 
Total = 53 
(of 72), or 73.6% 
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time, whereas they judged the operation to be safe nine-tenths of the time when performed during the 1.5x traffic 
density level.  This lower safety assessment in the 2,0x scenario is consistent with the ground-based LOS discussion 
included in the safety section of this paper, as the departure flows with the highest complexity leading to separation 
problems occurred in the 2.0x scenarios. 
A Friedman test indicated that there was not a significant difference in controllers’ ratings of safety by scenario.  
Separate Wilcoxon tests of the traffic and metering conditions showed that the level of traffic, although it accounts 
for the difference, was not significant. 
Pilots’ post-scenario questionnaire responses indicate that the majority of the airborne concept experiment’s M 
scenarios were perceived as involving safe operations.  When asked if they felt that safety was ever compromised, 
pilots  responded  “yes”  after  39 of  the M  scenarios  and  responded  “no”  after  325* of the M scenarios; i.e., pilots 
reported experiencing unsafe conditions during approximately 11 percent of the M scenarios.  The majority (67 
percent) of the unsafe conditions were reported to be experienced during scenarios involving the higher (2.0x) traffic 
density level (28 percent during M2, and 38 percent during M3).  In some instances, pilots commented that the 
single-pilot testing of the airborne concept in this experiment precluded the opportunity for crew cross-checks of 
conflict resolutions and other trajectory changes, which would be paramount for safety in an operational setting. 
 
Controller and Pilot Post-Run Assessments of the S scenarios 
As  with  the  M  scenarios,  the  controllers’  modal  CARS  rating  for  the  S  scenarios  was  “8,”  indicating  that 
“minimal  controller  compensation  [was]  needed  to  reach  desired  performance.”    Sixty-three percent of the 
controllers gave the operation this rating, indicating that they felt it was satisfactory and had adequate performance.  
When tested against the three rescheduling conditions (S1, S2, and S3), using a Friedman test, these CARS ratings 
were not significantly different.  
Table 22 splits out the three selections made by controllers to create the CARS – based on safety, adequacy, and 
“satisfactoriness.”  For example, column two of the table shows that 79 percent of responses said the operation was 
safe, and these confirmations were fairly evenly spread across the three conditions. The table shows that 
approximately the same number of responses associated with each type of metering judged the ground-based 
operation to be firstly safe and then adequate (approximately 75 to 80 percent).  However, when considering the 
non-rescheduled condition (S1), an eighth of the controllers’ responses to the satisfactory question were negative – 
enough to make this condition stand out as less acceptable than the other two conditions, even though S1 ratings 
were not found to be significantly different.  This fact indicates that controllers found a non-adjusting schedule less 
acceptable than one that adjusted, but when rescheduling occurred, the two timing schemes were equally acceptable. 
Pilots’ post-scenario questionnaire responses indicate that the majority of the airborne concept experiment’s S 
scenarios were perceived as involving safe operations.  When asked if they felt that safety was ever compromised, 
pilots  responded  “yes”  after  16  of  the  S  scenarios  and  responded  “no”  after  274† of the S scenarios; i.e., pilots 
reported experiencing unsafe conditions during approximately 6 percent of the S scenarios.  The majority (81 
percent) of the unsafe conditions were reported to be experienced during scenarios involving trajectory change 
events (38 percent during S2, and 43 percent during S3). 
 
                                                          
* A  total  of  368 M  scenarios  were  completed  by  the  airborne  concept  experiment’s  pilot  participants  (i.e.,  eight 
scenarios were completed by each of 46 pilots).  However, only 364 responses were provided for this particular 
post-scenario questionnaire item. 
† A  total  of  276  S  scenarios  were  completed  by  the  airborne  concept  experiment’s  pilot  participants  (i.e.,  six 
scenarios were completed by each of 46 pilots).  However, only 274 responses were provided for this particular 
post-scenario questionnaire item. 
Table 22. Confirmation counts for the ground-based  concept  over  the  three  S  scenarios’  CARS 
ratings. 
 
Rescheduling 
Operation 
Rated 
“Safe” 
Operation 
Rated 
“Adequate” 
Operation 
Rated 
“Satisfactory” 
Total Ratings Above 
“Acceptable” 
S1 None 37 (of 48) 37 (of 37) 31 (of 37) 31 
S2 Dispersed 39 (of 48) 38 (of 39) 36 (of 38) 36 
S3 Synchronous 38 (of 48) 36 (of 38) 36 (of 36) 36 
  Total = 114 
(of 144), or 79% 
Total = 111 
(of 114), or 97% 
Total = 103 
(of 111), or 93% 
Total = 103  
(out of 144), or 71.5% 
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Controller and Pilot Post-Experiment Assessments  
At the end of the experiment, the ground-based  study’s  18  controller  participants  were  asked  to  rate  the 
acceptability of their role in the ground-based concept.  They provided a mean response of 4.33 (“acceptable”) on a 
five-point scale (SD = 0.68, N = 18), where “1” corresponded to “completely unacceptable,” and “5” corresponded 
to  “completely  acceptable.” They also thought that the ground-based  automation  offered  “some  timely  support” 
(M=3.88 on a 5-point, low to high scale, SD=0.58, N=18) when asked if the automation supported them at the level 
they needed during the study.  
One of the main differences in the ground based study between the concept and the current day is that the 
automation makes an assessment before it presents information to the controllers.  The controllers were asked if they 
felt the automation left them enough time to work on the problems it had identified.  They responded that the 
automation gave them a “reasonable” amount of time to work on problems (M=3.44 on a 5-point, low to high scale, 
SD =1.24, N=18).  
For the ground-based study, the issue of needing more assistance with increased task-load was addressed by 
asking controllers whether they had to rely more on the automation tools as traffic level and complexity increased. 
Controllers said  they “relied on  the  tools a  lot more” (M=4.88 on a 5-point, low to high scale, SD =0.48, N=18). 
Controllers also rated how comfortable they were with their task load at the end of each run.  In both the M 
scenarios and the S scenarios, controllers’ mean responses were  that  their  task  load was “light” (for M scenarios: 
M=2.64, SD = 1.52, N = 72;    for S scenarios: M=3.11, SD = 1.73, N = 144), when using a  scale of 1  (“too few 
tasks”) to 7 (“too many tasks”). 
Pilots’ post-experiment questionnaire responses indicate that they felt they could use airborne self-separation in a 
relatively effective manner and that they found the operational concept to be somewhat acceptable given their 
relatively limited exposure to the concept’s implementation within one experiment environment.  Using a scale of 1 
(“very  effectively”)  to  7  (“very  ineffectively”)  to  rate  how  effectively  they  could  use  airborne  self-separation to 
operate within high density en-route airspace, the pilots’ mean response was 2.41 (SD = 1.02, N = 46).  Similarly, 
when asked to rate the acceptability of the airborne self-separation concept using a scale of 1 (“very acceptable”) to 
7 (“very unacceptable”), the mean response was 2.54 (SD = 1.26, N = 46). 
Pilots reported that they would be somewhat comfortable using the operational concept to fly through high 
density en-route airspace, and they indicated that they felt the safety of airborne self-separation, as it was 
represented in the airborne concept experiment, would have a safety level comparable to that associated with current 
day operations.  The pilots provided a mean response of 3.02 (SD = 1.31, N = 46) when using a scale of 1 (“very 
comfortable”) to 7 (“very uncomfortable”) to rate how comfortable they would be flying through high density en-
route airspace requiring the use of airborne self-separation, and they provided a mean response of 3.65 (SD = 1.29, 
N =  46) when  using  a  scale  of  1  (“safety  is  enhanced”)  to  7  (“safety  is  compromised”)  to  describe  their  overall 
assessment of the safety of airborne self-separation.  During the group debrief sessions, pilots commented that their 
perception of safety was reduced by occasions of short-notice conflict alerts and situations where the automation 
provided no resolutions. 
With respect to workload, 80 percent of  the  airborne  concept  experiment’s  pilot  participants  reported  that  the 
self-separation procedures they were asked to use would serve as an acceptable workload trade-off when compared 
with current day procedures for maintaining separation.  When asked to rate the acceptability of the new self-
separation procedures in terms of required workload level, when compared with current day procedures, the pilots 
provided a mean response of 3.13 (SD = 1.39, N = 46) using a scale of 1 (“very acceptable workload level”) to 7 
(“very  unacceptable workload  level”).   When asked  to  rate  how well  they  thought  the  self-separation procedures 
could be integrated into the current flight deck operational environment, assuming the availability of appropriate 
decision support tools, the pilots provided a mean response of 2.67 (SD = 1.15, N = 46) using a scale of 1 (“can be 
integrated easily”) to 7 (“cannot be integrated”). 
V I . Summary of F indings  
In a coordinated effort, two human-in-the-loop simulation experiments of two operational concepts were jointly 
designed and conducted in parallel to explore function allocation in separation assurance.  In the centralized concept 
ground-based automated separation assurance (‘ground-based concept’), ground-based automation predicts aircraft 
trajectories, detects conflicts, computes resolution trajectories, and issues trajectory amendments automatically to 
aircraft by data link communication if the resolution is within acceptable limits.  The air traffic controller monitors 
the operation and is available for providing services and handling exceptions, such as creating or approving 
trajectories when the initial automated solution is outside the predefined tolerances.  The pilot, in a role unchanged 
from current day operations, executes the instructions in a timely manner.  In the distributed concept airborne 
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trajectory management with self-separation (‘airborne concept’), airborne automation predicts aircraft trajectories, 
detects conflicts, alerts the pilot, computes resolution trajectory alternatives, and displays these alternatives to the 
pilot.  The pilot selects from among the alternative resolutions and executes the new trajectory.  The controller 
performs no separation function for the equipped aircraft, but the Air Navigation Service Provider supplies traffic 
flow management constraints to equipped aircraft. 
This pair of coordinated experiments was the first in a series of planned experiments that together are intended to 
illuminate the performance and other attributes of function allocation for separation assurance across a range of 
conditions.  The first two experiments tested homogeneous operations in nominal conditions, i.e., all aircraft 
operating under the same separation scheme and no failure modes or other conditions disruptive of normal 
procedures.  The principal goals of this initial activity were to determine how to achieve comparability of results and 
to provide baseline data for the later experiments in which mixed operations and off-nominal conditions will be 
introduced.  The approach taken to achieve comparability was to run common traffic scenarios in a set of common 
test matrices.  The independent variables were traffic density (1.5x and 2.0x of current day levels), arrival 
scheduling (without and with), and the timing of arrival rescheduling (none, dispersed assignment times, 
synchronous assignment times).  Common metrics were defined to aid in comparability of results.  The joint 
experiments achieved the goal of producing comparable results in some metrics, but not all metrics were suitable for 
direct comparison.   
Comparability was maximized in metrics primarily associated with automation performance: conflicts detected, 
times before predicted separation loss of initial detection and final resolution, flight path efficiency, and arrival time 
conformance.   Performance in these respects was generally similar and acceptable, with most differences 
attributable to differing automation systems designs.   Differences in the conflict results were also attributed to the 
greater interactivity of pilots in the airborne simulation than controllers in the ground-based simulation, resulting in 
some pilots changing trajectories and experiencing a different traffic environment (and therefore conflicts) than the 
corresponding ground-based aircraft.  The airborne system was observed to detect generally more conflicts than the 
ground-based system but with less consistent behavior with regard to traffic density and schedule constraints.  The 
ground-based approach appeared to show greater sensitivity to traffic density of conflicts detected and times of 
initial detection and final resolution than the airborne approach but its conflicts were generally detected and resolved 
sooner than in the airborne experiment.  Mean times for final clearing of conflicts were greater than five minutes to 
the predicted separation loss for both concepts, indicating acceptable conflict resolution performance.   
The efficiency metrics of flight path deviation and arrival schedule conformance indicated similar results for the 
two concepts.  Flight path deviation (typically occurring because of conflict resolution maneuvers) increased with 
traffic density but was not affected by the inclusion of arrival time constraints.  Median predicted arrival-time 
conformance was excellent for both concepts and was not affected by traffic density.  Minor differences were 
attributed to the airborne use of “required time of arrival” auto-throttle control as compared to the ground-based use 
of speed commands to enhance ground-system trajectory prediction accuracy.  An arrival schedule change (delay) 
increased the mean flight path length (as expected from delay maneuvers) in the airborne experiment but not in the 
ground-based experiment.  The difference was attributed to the ground controllers not having adequate time to 
complete the assignment of delay maneuvers to all arriving aircraft prior to scenario termination and thus fewer 
aircraft having a changed path length as compared to the same aircraft in the airborne experiment.   
With the change in arrival schedule, the aircraft in the airborne experiment, as compared to the ground-based 
experiment, had better mean arrival time conformance and less dispersion but equivalently excellent median 
conformance.  Mean arrival time conformance was better without rescheduling than with rescheduling for both 
concepts, attributed in the ground-based experiment to controllers having inadequate time within the short scenario 
to reschedule flights and in the airborne experiment to some pilots electing to postpone the delay maneuver 
execution until later in the flight.  The relative timing of the rescheduling assignments (dispersed or synchronous 
among aircraft) had no significant effect in the efficiency metrics of either experiment. 
Direct comparability was not achievable for some metrics, although limited comparisons were possible in some 
areas and some similar themes emerged in others.  The type of conflict resolutions executed (strategic or tactical) 
had only limited comparability because of significant differences in system design.  Both concepts had tactical 
modes that were activated in situations with only a short time available for resolution, but this time was one to two 
minutes earlier for the airborne concept.  Thus, the airborne experiment registered more occurrences of tactical 
resolutions than did the ground-based experiment.  Losses of separation were experienced in both experiments, but 
the quantity and nature of the events were unique to each simulation and cannot be compared.  In the ground-based 
experiment, late detections and complex interactions of traffic flows that were used as background traffic in the 
airborne experiment were the primary contributing factors.  In the airborne experiment, simulation faults and pilot 
procedural errors were the primary contributing factors.  For both concepts, analysis of the separation loss data will 
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result in system and procedural improvements to reduce the likelihood of reoccurrence of these failure modes in 
future studies. 
Subjective assessments by the subject participants could not be directly compared because of their different roles 
and perspectives in their respective concepts.  Since this fact was known a priori, the use of differing data collection 
instruments traditionally used in each laboratory was considered acceptable, although each experiment sought 
similar information in the areas of workload ratings and ratings of the operational concepts and procedures.  In 
assessing workload, the controllers in the ground-based experiment indicated that average to below average mental 
demand was required, and that they felt below average to low time pressure to complete their tasks.  The pilots in the 
airborne experiment indicated a difficulty level of fair or mild and that an acceptable level of mental effort was 
required to attain adequate performance.  Specific instances of high subjective workload were registered in both 
experiments, and these instances will be further analyzed to determine what system and procedural improvements 
may be required.  In the ground-based experiment, workload ratings increased with traffic density but not with the 
inclusion of schedule constraints.  In the airborne experiment, workload ratings increased with the inclusion of 
scheduling constraints but not with increased traffic density.  In both experiments, rescheduling increased workload 
but the relative timing of the rescheduling among aircraft had no effect. 
In assessing concept acceptability, the controllers in the ground-based experiment and the pilots in the airborne 
experiment felt the concepts were safe for the majority of runs, but unsafe during a significant percentage of others.  
Controllers found their role in the ground-based concept to be acceptable.  Pilots in the airborne experiment 
indicated they would feel somewhat comfortable using airborne self-separation in high density en-route airspace and 
that the safety level would be comparable to that associated with current day operations.   
V I I . Conclusions and Recommendations 
This paper describes a first step within NASA’s multi-year research plan to study advanced function allocation 
concepts for NextGen separation assurance in high density airspace. At the end of this research, we hope to have 
identified and quantified the most viable options for allocating the functions between the air and the ground, as well 
as the human and the automation, and to be able to provide concrete recommendations for implementation from a 
technical perspective. This first experiment described in this paper is not intended to provide such guidance. This 
experiment was designed to initiate the process of providing directly comparable results when conducting research 
on different functional allocation concepts in different laboratories, while also gathering additional data about the 
operational concepts under investigation. 
Providing comparable results is a very challenging task, and while many efforts were made, only small subsets of 
the data from this experiment could actually be directly compared.  Nevertheless, where comparisons were possible, 
no substantial differences in performance or operator acceptability were observed. Mean schedule conformance and 
flight path deviation were considered adequate for both approaches. Conflict detection warning times and resolution 
times were mostly adequate, but certain conflict situations were detected too late to be resolved in a timely manner. 
This led to some situations in which safety was compromised and/or workload was rated as being unacceptable in 
both experiments. Operators acknowledged these issues in their responses and ratings but gave generally positive 
assessments of the respective concept and operations they experienced. Future studies will evaluate technical 
improvements and procedural enhancements to achieve the required level of safety and acceptability. 
The function allocation concept between the operator and the automation that is pursued within each individual 
approach, airborne and ground-based, appears to be tangible and on the right track but needs further refinement. 
Gaining additional insight into the function allocation between the air and the ground is planned as the next step. 
With these homogeneous performance baseline studies now completed, future studies will investigate the integration 
of airborne and ground-based capabilities within the same airspace to leverage the benefits of each concept.  
As these future experiments will have to provide data that enable a true comparison of performance and 
problems with different approaches, the intended comparisons have to be further integrated into the experimental 
design. While several factors were included in this first experiment, this activity also highlighted areas that could be 
improved to increase the range of comparable results. 
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